Biblio

Web services use server-side input sanitization to guard against harmful input. Some web services publish their sanitization logic to make their client interface more usable, e.g., allowing clients to debug invalid requests locally. However, this usability practice poses a security risk. Specifically, services may share the regexes they use to sanitize input strings - and regex-based denial of service (ReDoS) is an emerging threat. Although prominent service outages caused by ReDoS have spurred interest in this topic, we know little about the degree to which live web services are vulnerable to ReDoS. In this paper, we conduct the first black-box study measuring the extent of ReDoS vulnerabilities in live web services. We apply the Consistent Sanitization Assumption: that client-side sanitization logic, including regexes, is consistent with the sanitization logic on the server-side. We identify a service's regex-based input sanitization in its HTML forms or its API, find vulnerable regexes among these regexes, craft ReDoS probes, and pinpoint vulnerabilities. We analyzed the HTML forms of 1,000 services and the APIs of 475 services. Of these, 355 services publish regexes; 17 services publish unsafe regexes; and 6 services are vulnerable to ReDoS through their APIs (6 domains; 15 subdomains). Both Microsoft and Amazon Web Services patched their web services as a result of our disclosure. Since these vulnerabilities were from API specifications, not HTML forms, we proposed a ReDoS defense for a popular API validation library, and our patch has been merged. To summarize: in client-visible sanitization logic, some web services advertise Re-DoS vulnerabilities in plain sight. Our results motivate short-term patches and long-term fundamental solutions. “Make measurable what cannot be measured.” -Galileo Galilei

The main goal of the system is to make it easier to standardize the style of program code written in C++. Based on the results of the review of existing static analyzers, in addition to the main requirements, requirements for the structure of stylistic rules were identified. Based on the results obtained, a system for static analysis of the C++ language has been developed, consisting of a set of modules. The system is implemented using the Python 3.7 programming language. HTML and CSS markup languages were used to generate html reports. To ensure that rules can be stored in the database, the MongoDB database management system and the pymongo driver module were used.

Cybersecurity is one of critical issues in modern military operations. In cyber operations, security professionals depend on various information and security systems to mitigate cyber threats through enhanced cyber situational awareness. Cyber situational awareness can give decision makers mission completeness and providing appropriate timely decision support for proactive response. The crucial information for cyber situational awareness can be collected at network boundaries through deep packet inspection with security systems. Regular expression is regarded as a practical method for deep packet inspection that is considering a next generation intrusion detection and prevention, however, it is not commonly used by the reason of its resource intensive characteristics. In this paper, we describe our effort and achievement on regular expression processing capability in real time and an evaluation method with experimental result.

To match the signatures of malicious traffic across packet boundaries, network-intrusion detection (and prevention) systems (NIDS) typically perform pattern matching after flow reassembly or packet reordering. However, this may lead to the need for large packet buffers, making detection vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, whereby attackers exhaust the buffer capacity by sending long sequences of out-of-order packets. While researchers have proposed solutions for exact-match patterns, regular-expression matching on out-of-order packets is still an open problem. Specifically, a key challenge is the matching of complex sub-patterns (such as repetitions of wildcards matched at the boundary between packets). Our proposed approach leverages the insight that various segments matching the same repetitive sub-pattern are logically equivalent to the regular-expression matching engine, and thus, inter-changing them would not affect the final result. In this paper, we present O3FA, a new finite automata-based, deep packet-inspection engine to perform regular-expression matching on out-of-order packets without requiring flow reassembly. O3FA consists of a deterministic finite automaton (FA) coupled with a set of prefix-/suffix-FA, which allows processing out-of-order packets on the fly. We present our design, optimization, and evaluation for the O3FA engine. Our experiments show that our design requires 20x-4000x less buffer space than conventional buffering-and-reassembling schemes on various datasets and that it can process packets in real-time, i.e., without reassembly.

Web applications must ultimately command systems like web browsers and database engines using strings. Strings derived from improperly sanitized user input can as a result be a vector for command injection attacks. In this paper, we introduce regular string types, which classify strings constrained statically to be in a regular language specified by a regular expression. Regular strings support standard string operations like concatenation and substitution, as well as safe coercions, so they can be used to implement, in an essentially conventional manner, the pieces of a web application or framework that handle strings arising from user input. Simple type annotations at function interfaces can be used to statically verify that sanitization has been performed correctly without introducing redundant run-time checks. We specify this type system first as a minimal typed lambda calculus, lambdaRS. To be practical, adopting a specialized type system like this should not require the adoption of a new programming language. Instead, we advocate for extensible type systems: new type system fragments like this should be implemented as libraries atop a mechanism that guarantees that they can be safely composed. We support this with two contributions. First, we specify a translation from lambdaRS to a calculus with only standard strings and regular expressions. Then, taking Python as a language with these constructs, we implement the type system together with the translation as a library using typy, an extensible static type system for Python.