Biblio
Network security policies contain requirements - including system and software features as well as expected and desired actions of human actors. In this paper, we present a framework for evaluation of textual network security policies as requirements documents to identify areas for improvement. Specifically, our framework concentrates on completeness. We use topic modeling coupled with expert evaluation to learn the complete list of important topics that should be addressed in a network security policy. Using these topics as a checklist, we evaluate (students) a collection of network security policies for completeness, i.e., the level of presence of these topics in the text. We developed three methods for topic recognition to identify missing or poorly addressed topics. We examine network security policies and report the results of our analysis: preliminary success of our approach.
Repairing erroneous or conflicting data that violate a set of constraints is an important problem in data management. Many automatic or semi-automatic data-repairing algorithms have been proposed in the last few years, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. Bart is an open-source error-generation system conceived to support thorough experimental evaluations of these data-repairing systems. The demo is centered around three main lessons. To start, we discuss how generating errors in data is a complex problem, with several facets. We introduce the important notions of detectability and repairability of an error, that stand at the core of Bart. Then, we show how, by changing the features of errors, it is possible to influence quite significantly the performance of the tools. Finally, we concretely put to work five data-repairing algorithms on dirty data of various kinds generated using Bart, and discuss their performance.
A3 is an execution management environment that aims to make network-facing applications and services resilient against zero-day attacks. A3 recently underwent two adversarial evaluations of its defensive capabilities. In one, A3 defended an App Store used in a Capture the Flag (CTF) tournament, and in the other, a tactically relevant network service in a red team exercise. This paper describes the A3 defensive technologies evaluated, the evaluation results, and the broader lessons learned about evaluations for technologies that seek to protect critical systems from zero-day attacks.
Software patterns are created with the goal of capturing expert
knowledge so it can be efficiently and effectively shared with the
software development community. However, patterns in practice
may or may not achieve these goals. Empirical studies of the use
of software patterns can help in providing deeper insight into
whether these goals have been met. The objective of this paper is
to aid researchers in designing empirical studies of software
patterns by summarizing the study designs of software patterns
available in the literature. The important components of these
study designs include the evaluation criteria and how the patterns
are presented to study participants. We select and analyze 19
distinct empirical studies and identify 17 independent variables in
three different categories (participants demographics; pattern
presentation; problem presentation). We also extract 10 evaluation
criteria with 23 associated observable measures. Additionally, by
synthesizing the reported observations, we identify challenges
faced during study execution. Provision of multiple domainspecific
examples of pattern application and tool support to assist
in pattern selection are helpful for the study participants in
understanding and completing the study task. Capturing data
regarding the cognitive processes of participants can provide
insights into the findings of the study.