A Formal Security Analysis of Even-Odd Sequential Prefetching in Profiled Cache-Timing Attacks
| Title | A Formal Security Analysis of Even-Odd Sequential Prefetching in Profiled Cache-Timing Attacks |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2016 |
| Authors | Bhattacharya, Sarani, Rebeiro, Chester, Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep |
| Conference Name | Proceedings of the Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy 2016 |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
| ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-4769-3 |
| Keywords | cache miss, Hardware Prefetcher, profiled cache-timing attacks, quantifying information leakage |
| Abstract | Hardware cache prefetching has a profound impact on the memory access pattern of ciphers which are exploited in profiled cache-timing attacks. In this paper, we formally demonstrate that memory access patterns influenced by sequential prefetching and its variant, known as even-odd prefetcher has varying information leakage dependent on the alignment of the underlying tables used in the cipher implementation. This demonstrates that a suitable architecture choice for the hardware prefetcher combined with appropriate memory alignment in software can lead to prefetching architectures which are leakage resilient. |
| URL | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2948618.2948624 |
| DOI | 10.1145/2948618.2948624 |
| Citation Key | bhattacharya_formal_2016 |
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