Visible to the public Bootstrapping and Maintaining Trust in the Cloud

TitleBootstrapping and Maintaining Trust in the Cloud
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2016
AuthorsSchear, Nabil, Cable, II, Patrick T., Moyer, Thomas M., Richard, Bryan, Rudd, Robert
Conference NameProceedings of the 32Nd Annual Conference on Computer Security Applications
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-4771-6
Keywordspubcrawl170201
Abstract

Today's infrastructure as a service (IaaS) cloud environments rely upon full trust in the provider to secure applications and data. Cloud providers do not offer the ability to create hardware-rooted cryptographic identities for IaaS cloud resources or sufficient information to verify the integrity of systems. Trusted computing protocols and hardware like the TPM have long promised a solution to this problem. However, these technologies have not seen broad adoption because of their complexity of implementation, low performance, and lack of compatibility with virtualized environments. In this paper we introduce keylime, a scalable trusted cloud key management system. keylime provides an end-to-end solution for both bootstrapping hardware rooted cryptographic identities for IaaS nodes and for system integrity monitoring of those nodes via periodic attestation. We support these functions in both bare-metal and virtualized IaaS environments using a virtual TPM. keylime provides a clean interface that allows higher level security services like disk encryption or configuration management to leverage trusted computing without being trusted computing aware. We show that our bootstrapping protocol can derive a key in less than two seconds, we can detect system integrity violations in as little as 110ms, and that keylime can scale to thousands of IaaS cloud nodes.

URLhttp://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2991079.2991104
DOI10.1145/2991079.2991104
Citation Keyschear_bootstrapping_2016