Wireless Sensor Networks Under the Random Pairwise Key Predistribution Scheme: Can Resiliency Be Achieved With Small Key Rings?

We investigate the resiliency of wireless sensor networks against sensor capture attacks when the network uses the random pairwise key distribution scheme of Chan et al. We present conditions on the model parameters so that the network is: 1 unassailable and 2 unsplittable, both with high probability, as the number \$n\$ of sensor nodes becomes large. Both notions are defined against an adversary who has unlimited computing resources and full knowledge of the network topology, but can only capture a negligible fraction \$on\$ of sensors. We also show that the number of cryptographic keys needed to ensure unassailability and unsplittability under the pairwise key predistribution scheme is an order of magnitude smaller than it is under the key predistribution scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor.