Visible to the public A Verified Algorithm for Detecting Conflicts in XACML Access Control Rules

TitleA Verified Algorithm for Detecting Conflicts in XACML Access Control Rules
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2016
AuthorsSt-Martin, Michel, Felty, Amy P.
Conference NameProceedings of the 5th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Certified Programs and Proofs
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-4127-1
KeywordsAccess Control, Coq, formal verification, Human Behavior, policy analysis, program correctness, pubcrawl, Resiliency, Scalability, Security Policies Analysis, XACML
Abstract

We describe the formalization of a correctness proof for a conflict detection algorithm for XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language). XACML is a standardized declarative access control policy language that is increasingly used in industry. In practice it is common for rule sets to grow large, and contain unintended errors, often due to conflicting rules. A conflict occurs in a policy when one rule permits a request and another denies that same request. Such errors can lead to serious risks involving both allowing access to an unauthorized user as well as denying access to someone who needs it. Removing conflicts is thus an important aspect of debugging policies, and the use of a verified algorithm provides the highest assurance in a domain where security is important. In this paper, we focus on several complex XACML constructs, including time ranges and integer intervals, as well as ways to combine any number of functions using the boolean operators and, or, and not. The latter are the most complex, and add significant expressive power to the language. We propose an algorithm to find conflicts and then use the Coq Proof Assistant to prove the algorithm correct. We develop a library of tactics to help automate the proof.

URLhttp://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2854065.2854079
DOI10.1145/2854065.2854079
Citation Keyst-martin_verified_2016