| Title | Optimal Contract Design for Energy Procurement |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2014 |
| Authors | Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis |
| Conference Name | 52nd IEEE Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing |
| Abstract | We consider a mechanism design problem for strategic agents with multi-dimensional private information and uncertainty in their utility/cost functions. We show that the optimal mechanism is a menu of contracts that can be implemented as a nonlinear pricing scheme. We illustrate the result by considering an optimal energy procurement mechanism from a strategic seller with conventional (deterministic) and renewable (random) plants. We address the problem of risk-sharing and ex post voluntary participation (commitment) under uncertainty. |
| URL | https://cps-vo.org/node/38461 |
| Citation Key | TavafoghiTeneketzis14_OptimalContractDesignForEnergyProcurement |
Optimal Contract Design for Energy Procurement