Analyzing the Effectiveness of Attack Countermeasures in a SCADA System
Title | Analyzing the Effectiveness of Attack Countermeasures in a SCADA System |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2017 |
Authors | Korman, Matus, Välja, Margus, Björkman, Gunnar, Ekstedt, Mathias, Vernotte, Alexandre, Lagerström, Robert |
Conference Name | Proceedings of the 2Nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids |
Publisher | ACM |
Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-4978-9 |
Keywords | compositionality, CPS Resilience, cyber security, Human Behavior, Networked Control Systems Security, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, SCADA system, SCADA systems, security, security controls, threat modeling, vulnerability assessment |
Abstract | The SCADA infrastructure is a key component for power grid operations. Securing the SCADA infrastructure against cyber intrusions is thus vital for a well-functioning power grid. However, the task remains a particular challenge, not the least since not all available security mechanisms are easily deployable in these reliability-critical and complex, multi-vendor environments that host modern systems alongside legacy ones, to support a range of sensitive power grid operations. This paper examines how effective a few countermeasures are likely to be in SCADA environments, including those that are commonly considered out of bounds. The results show that granular network segmentation is a particularly effective countermeasure, followed by frequent patching of systems (which is unfortunately still difficult to date). The results also show that the enforcement of a password policy and restrictive network configuration including whitelisting of devices contributes to increased security, though best in combination with granular network segmentation. |
URL | https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3055386.3055393 |
DOI | 10.1145/3055386.3055393 |
Citation Key | korman_analyzing_2017 |