| Title | Why Your Encrypted Database Is Not Secure |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2017 |
| Authors | Grubbs, Paul, Ristenpart, Thomas, Shmatikov, Vitaly |
| Conference Name | Proceedings of the 16th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
| ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-5068-6 |
| Keywords | composability, compositionality, Metrics, provable security, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency |
| Abstract | Encrypted databases, a popular approach to protecting data from compromised database management systems (DBMS's), use abstract threat models that capture neither realistic databases, nor realistic attack scenarios. In particular, the "snapshot attacker" model used to support the security claims for many encrypted databases does not reflect the information about past queries available in any snapshot attack on an actual DBMS. We demonstrate how this gap between theory and reality causes encrypted databases to fail to achieve their "provable security" guarantees. |
| DOI | 10.1145/3102980.3103007 |
| Citation Key | grubbs_why_2017 |
Why Your Encrypted Database Is Not Secure