TCS Security Analysis in Intel SGX Enclave MultiThreading
| Title | TCS Security Analysis in Intel SGX Enclave MultiThreading |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2022 |
| Authors | Zhang, Tong, Cui, Xiangjie, Wang, Yichuan, Du, Yanning, Gao, Wen |
| Conference Name | 2022 International Conference on Networking and Network Applications (NaNA) |
| Date Published | dec |
| Keywords | codes, composability, Concurrency, Concurrent computing, Enclave, Flood Attacks, Instruction sets, Intel SGX, Metrics, Multithread Concurrency, multithreading, Operating systems, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Resists, security, Software, Thread Control Structure |
| Abstract | With the rapid development of Internet Technology in recent years, the demand for security support for complex applications is becoming stronger and stronger. Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) is created as an extension of Intel Systems to enhance software security. Intel SGX allows application developers to create so-called enclave. Sensitive application code and data are encapsulated in Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) by enclave. TEE is completely isolated from other applications, operating systems, and administrative programs. Enclave is the core structure of Intel SGX Technology. Enclave supports multi-threading. Thread Control Structure (TCS) stores special information for restoring enclave threads when entering or exiting enclave. Each execution thread in enclave is associated with a TCS. This paper analyzes and verifies the possible security risks of enclave under concurrent conditions. It is found that in the case of multithread concurrency, a single enclave cannot resist flooding attacks, and related threads also throw TCS exception codes. |
| DOI | 10.1109/NaNA56854.2022.00054 |
| Citation Key | zhang_tcs_2022 |