Cyber--physical systems (CPS) have become increasingly prevalent in applications including health care, energy, and transportation. The tight coupling between cyber and physical components of CPS implies that cyber--attacks can degrade the safety, availability, and performance of physical components. The cyber components also introduce multiple entry points to the CPS, lowering the cost of attacks compared to purely physical systems.
Trustworthy operation of next-generation complex power grid critical infrastructures requires mathematical and practical verification solutions to guarantee the correct infrastructural functionalities. This project develops the foundations of theoretical modeling, synthesis and real-world deployment of a formal and scalable controller code verifier for programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in cyber-physical settings. PLCs are widely used for control automation in industrial control systems.
Cyber-physical systems regulating critical infrastructures, such as electrical grids and water networks, are increasingly geographically distributed, necessitating communication between remote sensors, actuators and controllers. The combination of networked computational and physical sub- systems leads to new security vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit with devastating consequences.
Critical physical infrastructures, such as electrical grids and water networks etc., are increasingly controlled through a distributed cyber-systems which make it vulnerable to attacks. This project is devoted to developing the foundations of security of such cyber-physical systems.
Our project aims at developing techniques for secured real-time services for cyber-physical systems. In the first phase of the project, our research has incorporated real-time traffic modeling techniques into the security service, consequently enhancing both system security and real-time capabilities in an adverse environment.
