Biblio

Another risk posed by the limited number of available vendors is the threat of supply chain attacks. According to researchers at CrowdStrike on June 27, 2017 the destructive malware known as NotPetya was deployed using a legitimate software package employed by organizations operating in Ukraine. The attack used an update mechanism built into the software to provide updates and distribute them to the vendor’s customers. This same mechanism had been used a month earlier to deploy other ransomware attacks. Supply chain attacks exploit a trust relationship between software or hardware vendors and their customers. These attacks can be widespread targeting the entire trusted vendor’s customer base and are growing in frequency as well as sophistication.

We also sought to shed light on a yet-unexamined attack vector as it translates to healthcare networks: supply chain attacks. Several high-profile breaches in recent years involved lapses in the supply chain. Furthermore, according to a health and human services public breach reporting tool, 30 percent of healthcare breaches in 2016 were due to business associates and third-party vendor breaches. To learn from these cases, we studied the different ways threat actors can take advantage of weaknesses in the supply chain to infiltrate healthcare networks.

The Case Studies in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management series engaged with several companies that are mature in managing cyber supply chain risk. These case studies build on the Best Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management case studies originally published in 2015 with the goals of covering new organizations in new industries and bringing to light any changes in cyber supply chain risk management practices.

The Case Studies in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management series engaged with several companies that are mature in managing cyber supply chain risk. These case studies build on the Best Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management case studies originally published in 2015 with the goals of covering new organizations in new industries and bringing to light any changes in cyber supply chain risk management practices.

The Case Studies in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management series engaged with several companies that are leaders in managing cyber supply chain risk. These case studies build on the Best Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management case studies originally published in 2015 with the goals of covering new organizations in new industries and bringing to light any changes in cyber supply chain risk management practices. This case study is for the Mayo Clinic.

Supply chain exploitation, especially when executed in concert with cyber intrusions, malicious insiders, and economic espionage, threatens the integrity of key U.S. economic, critical infrastructure, and research/development sectors.

Information and Communications Technology (ICT) supply chain risk management (SCRM) is the process of identifying and mitigating risks in the manufacture and distribution of ICT products and services. While the Information Technology (IT) sector and the Communications sector face different supply chain risks, their mitigation strategies are similar. Both sectors emphasize having an end-to-end Cyber-SCRM program, continuously evaluating risks to vendor networks, and maintaining geographically-diverse and occasionally-redundant supply chains in the event of a manufacturer compromise.

This project developed a tool to assess cyber-supply chain risk management capabilities by consolidating the collective inputs of the set of public and private actors engaged in supporting Initiative 11. The Department of Commerce (NIST and Bureau of Industry and Security, BIS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Department of Defense (DOD/CIO and DOD/NSA); and the Government Services Administration all provided formal inputs to design the assessment tool.