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2019-08-21
Mingshuai Chen, Martin Fränzle, Yangjia Li, Peter N. Mosaad, Naijun Zhan.  2018.  Whats to Come is Still Unsure: Synthesizing Controllers Resilient to Delayed Interaction. Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis. 11138:56-74.

The possible interactions between a controller and its environment can naturally be modelled as the arena of a two-player game, and adding an appropriate winning condition permits to specify desirable behavior. The classical model here is the positional game, where both players can (fully or partially) observe the current position in the game graph, which in turn is indicative of their mutual current states. In practice, neither sensing or actuating the environment through physical devices nor data forwarding to and signal processing in the controller are instantaneous. The resultant delays force the controller to draw decisions before being aware of the recent history of a play. It is known that existence of a winning strategy for the controller in games with such delays is decidable over finite game graphs and with respect to ω-regular objectives. The underlying reduction, however, is impractical for non-trivial delays as it incurs a blow-up of the game graph which is exponential in the magnitude of the delay. For safety objectives, we propose a more practical incremental algorithm synthesizing a series of controllers handling increasing delays and reducing game-graph size in between. It is demonstrated using benchmark examples that even a simplistic explicit-state implementation of this algorithm outperforms state-of-the-art symbolic synthesis algorithms as soon as non-trivial delays have to be handled. We furthermore shed some light on the practically relevant case of non-order-preserving delays, as arising in actual networked control, thereby considerably extending the scope of regular game theory under delay pioneered by Klein and Zimmermann.

2018-09-30
B. Potteiger, W. Emfinger, H. Neema, X. Koutosukos, C. Tang, K. Stouffer.  2017.  Evaluating the effects of cyber-attacks on cyber physical systems using a hardware-in-the-loop simulation testbed. 2017 Resilience Week (RWS). :177-183.
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) consist of embedded computers with sensing and actuation capability, and are integrated into and tightly coupled with a physical system. Because the physical and cyber components of the system are tightly coupled, cyber-security is important for ensuring the system functions properly and safely. However, the effects of a cyberattack on the whole system may be difficult to determine, analyze, and therefore detect and mitigate. This work presents a model based software development framework integrated with a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed for rapidly deploying CPS attack experiments. The framework provides the ability to emulate low level attacks and obtain platform specific performance measurements that are difficult to obtain in a traditional simulation environment. The framework improves the cybersecurity design process which can become more informed and customized to the production environment of a CPS. The developed framework is illustrated with a case study of a railway transportation system.
X. Koutsoukos, G. Karsai, A. Laszka, H. Neema, B. Potteiger, P. Volgyesi, Y. Vorobeychik, J. Sztipanovits.  2018.  SURE: A Modeling and Simulation Integration Platform for Evaluation of Secure and Resilient Cyber–Physical Systems. Proceedings of the IEEE. 106:93-112.
The exponential growth of information and communication technologies have caused a profound shift in the way humans engineer systems leading to the emergence of closed-loop systems involving strong integration and coordination of physical and cyber components, often referred to as cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Because of these disruptive changes, physical systems can now be attacked through cyberspace and cyberspace can be attacked through physical means. The paper considers security and resilience as system properties emerging from the intersection of system dynamics and the computing architecture. A modeling and simulation integration platform for experimentation and evaluation of resilient CPSs is presented using smart transportation systems as the application domain. Evaluation of resilience is based on attacker-defender games using simulations of sufficient fidelity. The platform integrates 1) realistic models of cyber and physical components and their interactions; 2) cyber attack models that focus on the impact of attacks to CPS behavior and operation; and 3) operational scenarios that can be used for evaluation of cybersecurity risks. Three case studies are presented to demonstrate the advantages of the platform: 1) vulnerability analysis of transportation networks to traffic signal tampering; 2) resilient sensor selection for forecasting traffic flow; and 3) resilient traffic signal control in the presence of denial-of-service attacks.