Moghadam, Vahid Eftekhari, Meloni, Marco, Prinetto, Paolo.
2021.
Control-Flow Integrity for Real-Time Operating Systems: Open Issues and Challenges. 2021 IEEE East-West Design Test Symposium (EWDTS). :1–6.
The pervasive presence of smart objects in almost every corner of our everyday life urges the security of such embedded systems to be the point of attention. Memory vulnerabilities in the embedded program code, such as buffer overflow, are the entry point for powerful attack paradigms such as Code-Reuse Attacks (CRAs), in which attackers corrupt systems’ execution flow and maliciously alter their behavior. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) has been proven to be the most promising approach against such kinds of attacks, and in the literature, a wide range of flow monitors are proposed, both hardware-based and software-based. While the formers are hardly applicable as they impose design alteration of underlying hardware modules, on the contrary, software solutions are more flexible and also portable to the existing devices. Real-Time Operating Systems (RTOS) and their key role in application development for embedded systems is the main concern regarding the application of the CFI solutions.This paper discusses the still open challenges and issues regarding the implementation of control-flow integrity policies on operating systems for embedded systems, analyzing the solutions proposed so far in the literature, highlighting possible limits in terms of performance, applicability, and protection coverage, and proposing possible improvement directions.
Mambretti, Andrea, Sandulescu, Alexandra, Sorniotti, Alessandro, Robertson, William, Kirda, Engin, Kurmus, Anil.
2021.
Bypassing memory safety mechanisms through speculative control flow hijacks. 2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS P). :633–649.
The prevalence of memory corruption bugs in the past decades resulted in numerous defenses, such as stack canaries, control flow integrity (CFI), and memory-safe languages. These defenses can prevent entire classes of vulnerabilities, and help increase the security posture of a program. In this paper, we show that memory corruption defenses can be bypassed using speculative execution attacks. We study the cases of stack protectors, CFI, and bounds checks in Go, demonstrating under which conditions they can be bypassed by a form of speculative control flow hijack, relying on speculative or architectural overwrites of control flow data. Information is leaked by redirecting the speculative control flow of the victim to a gadget accessing secret data and acting as a side channel send. We also demonstrate, for the first time, that this can be achieved by stitching together multiple gadgets, in a speculative return-oriented programming attack. We discuss and implement software mitigations, showing moderate performance impact.
Huang, Hao, Davis, C. Matthew, Davis, Katherine R..
2021.
Real-time Power System Simulation with Hardware Devices through DNP3 in Cyber-Physical Testbed. 2021 IEEE Texas Power and Energy Conference (TPEC). :1—6.
Modern power grids are dependent on communication systems for data collection, visualization, and control. Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) is commonly used in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems in power systems to allow control system software and hardware to communicate. To study the dependencies between communication network security, power system data collection, and industrial hardware, it is important to enable communication capabilities with real-time power system simulation. In this paper, we present the integration of new functionality of a power systems dynamic simulation package into our cyber-physical power system testbed that supports real-time power system data transfer using DNP3, demonstrated with an industrial real-time automation controller (RTAC). The usage and configuration of DNP3 with real-world equipment in to achieve power system monitoring and control of a large-scale synthetic electric grid via this DNP3 communication is presented. Then, an exemplar of DNP3 data collection and control is achieved in software and hardware using the 2000-bus Texas synthetic grid.
Altunay, Hakan Can, Albayrak, Zafer, Özalp, Ahmet Nusret, Çakmak, Muhammet.
2021.
Analysis of Anomaly Detection Approaches Performed Through Deep Learning Methods in SCADA Systems. 2021 3rd International Congress on Human-Computer Interaction, Optimization and Robotic Applications (HORA). :1—6.
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are used with monitoring and control purposes for the process not to fail in industrial control systems. Today, the increase in the use of standard protocols, hardware, and software in the SCADA systems that can connect to the internet and institutional networks causes these systems to become a target for more cyber-attacks. Intrusion detection systems are used to reduce or minimize cyber-attack threats. The use of deep learning-based intrusion detection systems also increases in parallel with the increase in the amount of data in the SCADA systems. The unsupervised feature learning present in the deep learning approaches enables the learning of important features within the large datasets. The features learned in an unsupervised way by using deep learning techniques are used in order to classify the data as normal or abnormal. Architectures such as convolutional neural network (CNN), Autoencoder (AE), deep belief network (DBN), and long short-term memory network (LSTM) are used to learn the features of SCADA data. These architectures use softmax function, extreme learning machine (ELM), deep belief networks, and multilayer perceptron (MLP) in the classification process. In this study, anomaly-based intrusion detection systems consisting of convolutional neural network, autoencoder, deep belief network, long short-term memory network, or various combinations of these methods on the SCADA networks in the literature were analyzed and the positive and negative aspects of these approaches were explained through their attack detection performances.