Biblio

Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is an implementation of cloud computing that leverages virtualization technology to provide on-demand network functions such as firewalls, domain name servers, etc., as software services. One of the methods that help us understand the design and implementation process of such a new system in an abstract way is architectural modeling. Architectural modeling can be presented through UML diagrams to show the interaction between different components and its stakeholders. Also, it can be used to analyze the security threats and the possible countermeasures to mitigate the threats. In this paper, we show some of the possible threats that may jeopardize the security of NFV. We use misuse patterns to analyze misuses based on privilege escalation and VM escape threats. The misuse patterns are part of an ongoing catalog, which is the first step toward building a security reference architecture for NFV.

SCADA systems are being constantly migrated to modern information and communication technologies (ICT) -based systems named cyber-physical systems. Unfortunately, this allows attackers to execute exploitation techniques into these architectures. In addition, ransomware insertion is nowadays the most popular attacking vector because it denies the availability of critical files and systems until attackers receive the demanded ransom. In this paper, it is analysed the risk impact of ransomware insertion into SCADA systems and it is suggested countermeasures addressed to the protection of SCADA systems and its components to reduce the impact of ransomware insertion.

Linux container mechanism has attracted a lot of attention and is increasingly utilized to deploy industry applications. Though it is a consensus that the container mechanism is not secure due to the kernel-sharing property, it lacks a concrete and systematical evaluation on its security using real world exploits. In this paper, we collect an attack dataset including 223 exploits that are effective on the container platform, and classify them into different categories using a two-dimensional attack taxonomy. Then we evaluate the security of existing Linux container mechanism using 88 typical exploits filtered out from the dataset. We find 50 (56.82%) exploits can successfully launch attacks from inside the container with the default configuration. Since the privilege escalation exploits can completely disable the container protection mechanism, we conduct an in-depth analysis on these exploits. We find the kernel security mechanisms such as Capability, Seccomp, and MAC play a more important role in preventing privilege escalation than the container isolation mechanisms (i.e., Namespace and Cgroup). However, the interdependence and mutual-influence relationship among these kernel security mechanisms may make them fall into the "short board effect" and impair their protection capability. By studying the 11 exploits that still can successfully break the isolation provided by container and achieve privilege escalation, we identify a common 4-step attack model followed by all 11 exploits. Finally, we propose a defense mechanism to effectively defeat those identified privilege escalation attacks.

Attacks on web services are major concerns and can expose organizations valuable information resources. Despite there are increasing awareness in secure programming, we still find vulnerabilities in web services. To protect deployed web services, it is important to have defense techniques. Signaturebased Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have gained popularity to protect applications against attacks. However, signature IDSs have limited number of attack signatures. In this paper, we propose a Genetic Algorithm (GA)-based attack signature generation approach and show its application for web services. GA algorithm has the capability of generating new member from a set of initial population. We leverage this by generating new attack signatures at SOAP message level to overcome the challenge of limited number of attack signatures. The key contributions include defining chromosomes and fitness functions. The initial results show that the GA-based IDS can generate new signatures and complement the limitation of existing web security testing tools. The approach can generate new attack signatures for injection, privilege escalation, denial of service and information leakage.

Privilege Escalation is a common and serious type of security attack. Although experience shows that many applications are vulnerable to such attacks, attackers rarely succeed upon first trial. Their initial probing attempts often fail before a successful breach of access control is achieved. This paper presents an approach to automatically instrument application source code to report events of failed access attempts that may indicate privilege escalation attacks to a run time application protection mechanism. The focus of this paper is primarily on the problem of instrumenting web application source code to detect access control attack events. We evaluated false positives and negatives of our approach using two open source web applications.

The wide deployment of general purpose and embedded microprocessors has emphasized the need for defenses against cyber-attacks. Due to the globalized supply chain, however, there are several stages where a processor can be maliciously modified. The most promising stage, and the hardest during which to inject the hardware trojan, is the fabrication stage. As modern microprocessor chips are characterized by very dense, billion-transistor designs, such attacks must be very carefully crafted. In this paper, we demonstrate zero overhead malicious modifications on both high-performance and embedded microprocessors. These hardware trojans enable privilege escalation through execution of an instruction stream that excites the necessary conditions to make the modification appear. The minimal footprint, however, comes at the cost of a small window of attack opportunities. Experimental results show that malicious users can gain escalated privileges within a few million clock cycles. In addition, no system crashes were reported during normal operation, rendering the modifications transparent to the end user.