Biblio

Cryptographic protocols are the basis for the security of any protected system, including the electronic voting system. One of the most effective ways to analyze protocol security is to use verifiers. In this paper, the formal verifier SPIN was used to analyze the security of the cryptographic protocol for e-voting, which is based on model checking using linear temporal logic (LTL). The cryptographic protocol of electronic voting is described. The main structural units of the Promela language used for simulation in the SPIN verifier are described. The model of the electronic voting protocol in the language Promela is given. The interacting parties, transferred data, the order of the messages transmitted between the parties are described. Security of the cryptographic protocol using the SPIN tool is verified. The simulation of the protocol with active intruder using the man in the middle attack (MITM) to substitute data is made. In the simulation results it is established that the protocol correctly handles the case of an active attack on the parties' authentication.

Middleboxes are crucial for improving network security and performance, but only if the right traffic goes through the right middleboxes at the right time. Existing traffic-steering techniques rely on a central controller to install fine-grained forwarding rules in network elements—at the expense of a large number of rules, a central point of failure, challenges in ensuring all packets of a session traverse the same middleboxes, and difficulties with middleboxes that modify the "five tuple." We argue that a session-level protocol is a fundamentally better approach to traffic steering, while naturally supporting host mobility and multihoming in an integrated fashion. In addition, a session-level protocol can enable new capabilities like dynamic service chaining, where the sequence of middleboxes can change during the life of a session, e.g., to remove a load-balancer that is no longer needed, replace a middlebox undergoing maintenance, or add a packet scrubber when traffic looks suspicious. Our Dysco protocol steers the packets of a TCP session through a service chain, and can dynamically reconfigure the chain for an ongoing session. Dysco requires no changes to end-host and middlebox applications, host TCP stacks, or IP routing. Dysco's distributed reconfiguration protocol handles the removal of proxies that terminate TCP connections, middleboxes that change the size of a byte stream, and concurrent requests to reconfigure different parts of a chain. Through formal verification using Spin and experiments with our Linux-based prototype, we show that Dysco is provably correct, highly scalable, and able to reconfigure service chains across a range of middleboxes.

Security is an important requirement of every reactive system of the smart gird. The devices connected to the smart system in smart grid are exhaustively used to provide digital information to outside world. The security of such a system is an essential requirement. The most important component of such smart systems is Operating System (OS). This paper mainly focuses on the security of OS by incorporating Access Control Mechanism (ACM) which will improve the efficiency of the smart system. The formal methods use applied mathematics for modelling and analysing of smart systems. In the proposed work Formal Security Analysis (FSA) is used with model checking and hence it helped to prove the security of smart systems. When an Operating System (OS) takes into consideration, it never comes to a halt state. In the proposed work a Transition System (TS) is designed and the desired rules of security are provided by using Linear Temporal Logics (LTL). Unlike other propositional and predicate logic, LTL can model reactive systems with a prediction for the future state of the systems. In the proposed work, Simple Promela Interpreter (SPIN) is used as a model checker that takes LTL and TS of the system as input. Hence it is possible to derive the Büchi automaton from LTL logics and that provides traces of both successful and erroneous computations. Comparison of Büchi automaton with the transition behaviour of the OS will provide the details of security violation in the system. Validation of automaton operations on infinite computational sequences verify that whether systems are provably secure or not. Hence the proposed formal security analysis will provably ensures the security of smart systems in the area of smart grid applications.

This paper presents verification and model based checking of the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP). Model checking is a technique for software verification that can detect concurrency defects within appropriate constraints by performing an exhaustive state space search on a software design or implementation and alert the implementing organization to potential design deficiencies that are otherwise difficult to be discovered. The TFTP is implemented on top of the Internet User Datagram Protocol (UDP) or any other datagram protocol. We aim to create a design model of TFTP protocol, with adding window size, using Promela to simulate it and validate some specified properties using spin. The verification has been done by using the model based checking tool SPIN which accepts design specification written in the verification language PROMELA. The results show that TFTP is free of live locks.