Biblio

Customer Relationship Management (CRM), Supply Chain Management (SCM), banking, and e-commerce are just a few of the internet-primarily based commercial enterprise programmes that make use of distributed computing generation. These programmes are the principal target of large-scale attacks known as DDoS attacks, which cause the denial of service (DoS) of resources to legitimate customers. Servers that provide dependable services to real consumers in distributed environments are vulnerable to such attacks, which send phoney requests that appear legitimate. Flash crowd, on the other hand, is a massive collection of traffic generated by flash events that imitate Distributed Denial of Service assaults. Detecting and distinguishing between Distributed Denial of Service assaults and flash crowds is a difficult problem to tackle, as is preventing DDoS attacks. Existing solutions are generally intended for DDoS attacks or flash crowds, and more research is required to have a thorough understanding. This study presents a technique for distinguishing between different types of Distributed Denial of Service attacks and Flash Crowds. This research work has suggested an approach to prevent DDOS attacks in addition to detecting and discriminating. The performance of the suggested technique is validated using NS-2 simulations.

The deployment of Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) technologies is increasing, with security as a recognized application driving adoption. However, despite the potential with SDN/NFV for automated and adaptive network security services, the controller interaction presents both a performance and scalability challenge, and a threat vector. To overcome the performance issue, stateful data-plane designs have been proposed. However, these solutions do not offer protection from SDN-specific attacks linked to necessary control functions such as link reconfiguration and switch identification. In this work, we leverage the OpenState framework to introduce state-based SDN security protection mechanisms. The extensions required for this design are presented with respect to an SDN configuration-based attack. The demonstration shows the ability of the SDN Configuration (CFG) security protection mechanism to support legitimate relocation requests and to protect against malicious connection attempts.