Biblio

The Internet of Battlefield Things is a relatively new cyberphysical system and even though it shares a lot of concepts from the Internet of Things and wireless ad hoc networking in general, a lot of research is required to address its scale and peculiarities. In this article we examine a fundamental problem pertaining to the routing/dissemination of information, namely the construction of a backbone. We model an IoBT ad hoc network as a multilayer network and employ the concept of domination for multilayer networks which is a complete departure from the volume of earlier works, in order to select sets of nodes that will support the routing of information. Even though there is huge literature on similar topics during the past many years, the problem in military (IoBT) networks is quite different since these wireless networks are multilayer networks and treating them as a single (flat) network or treating each layer in isolation and calculating dominating set produces submoptimal or bad solutions; thus all the past literature which deals with single layer (flat) networks is in principle inappropriate. We design a new, distributed algorithm for calculating connected dominating sets which produces dominating sets of small cardinality. We evaluate the proposed algorithm on synthetic topologies, and compare it against the only two existing competitors. The proposed algorithm establishes itself as the clear winner in all experiments.

In order to be resilient to attacks, a cyber-physical system (CPS) must be able to detect attacks before they can cause significant damage. To achieve this, \emph{intrusion detection systems} (IDS) may be deployed, which can detect attacks and alert human operators, who can then intervene. However, the resource-constrained nature of many CPS poses a challenge, since reliable IDS can be computationally expensive. Consequently, computational nodes may not be able to perform intrusion detection continuously, which means that we have to devise a schedule for performing intrusion detection. While a uniformly random schedule may be optimal in a purely cyber system, an optimal schedule for protecting CPS must also take into account the physical properties of the system, since the set of adversarial actions and their consequences depend on the physical systems. Here, in the context of water distribution networks, we study IDS scheduling problems in two settings and under the constraints on the available battery supplies. In the first problem, the objective is to design, for a given duration of time $T$, scheduling schemes for IDS so that the probability of detecting an attack is maximized within that duration. We propose efficient heuristic algorithms for this general problem and evaluate them on various networks. In the second problem, our objective is to design scheduling schemes for IDS so that the overall lifetime of the network is maximized while ensuring that an intruder attack is always detected. Various strategies to deal with this problem are presented and evaluated for various networks.