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2021-04-27
Matthews, I., Mace, J., Soudjani, S., Moorsel, A. van.  2020.  Cyclic Bayesian Attack Graphs: A Systematic Computational Approach. 2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom). :129–136.
Attack graphs are commonly used to analyse the security of medium-sized to large networks. Based on a scan of the network and likelihood information of vulnerabilities, attack graphs can be transformed into Bayesian Attack Graphs (BAGs). These BAGs are used to evaluate how security controls affect a network and how changes in topology affect security. A challenge with these automatically generated BAGs is that cycles arise naturally, which make it impossible to use Bayesian network theory to calculate state probabilities. In this paper we provide a systematic approach to analyse and perform computations over cyclic Bayesian attack graphs. We present an interpretation of Bayesian attack graphs based on combinational logic circuits, which facilitates an intuitively attractive systematic treatment of cycles. We prove properties of the associated logic circuit and present an algorithm that computes state probabilities without altering the attack graphs (e.g., remove an arc to remove a cycle). Moreover, our algorithm deals seamlessly with any cycle without the need to identify their type. A set of experiments demonstrates the scalability of the algorithm on computer networks with hundreds of machines, each with multiple vulnerabilities.
2018-02-06
Muñoz-González, Luis, Sgandurra, Daniele, Paudice, Andrea, Lupu, Emil C..  2017.  Efficient Attack Graph Analysis Through Approximate Inference. ACM Trans. Priv. Secur.. 20:10:1–10:30.

Attack graphs provide compact representations of the attack paths an attacker can follow to compromise network resources from the analysis of network vulnerabilities and topology. These representations are a powerful tool for security risk assessment. Bayesian inference on attack graphs enables the estimation of the risk of compromise to the system's components given their vulnerabilities and interconnections and accounts for multi-step attacks spreading through the system. While static analysis considers the risk posture at rest, dynamic analysis also accounts for evidence of compromise, for example, from Security Information and Event Management software or forensic investigation. However, in this context, exact Bayesian inference techniques do not scale well. In this article, we show how Loopy Belief Propagation—an approximate inference technique—can be applied to attack graphs and that it scales linearly in the number of nodes for both static and dynamic analysis, making such analyses viable for larger networks. We experiment with different topologies and network clustering on synthetic Bayesian attack graphs with thousands of nodes to show that the algorithm's accuracy is acceptable and that it converges to a stable solution. We compare sequential and parallel versions of Loopy Belief Propagation with exact inference techniques for both static and dynamic analysis, showing the advantages and gains of approximate inference techniques when scaling to larger attack graphs.

2016-11-16
Ravishankar K. Iyer, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Phuong Cao, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  2015.  Preemptive Intrusion Detection: Theoretical Framework and Real-world Measurements.

Presented at the NSA SoS Quarterly Lablet Meeting, January 2015 by Ravi Iyer.

Presented at the Illinois SoS Bi-Weekly Meeting, February 2015 by Phuong Cao.