Biblio

Peer-to-peer computing (P2P) refers to the famous technology that provides peers an equal spontaneous collaboration in the network by using appropriate information and communication systems without the need for a central server coordination. Today, the interconnection of several P2P networks has become a genuine solution for increasing system reliability, fault tolerance and resource availability. However, the existence of security threats in such networks, allows us to investigate the safety of users from P2P threats by studying the effects of competition between these interconnected networks. In this paper, we present an e-epidemic model to characterize the worm propagation in an interconnected peer-to-peer network. Here, we address this issue by introducing a model of network competition where an unprotected network is willing to partially weaken its own safety in order to more severely damage a more protected network. The unprotected network can infect all peers in the competitive networks after their non react against the passive worm propagation. Our model also evaluated the effect of an immunization strategies adopted by the protected network to resist against attacking networks. The launch time of immunization strategies in the protected network, the number of peers synapse connected to the both networks, and other effective parameters have also been investigated in this paper.

We show that competitive engagements within the agents of a network can result in resilience in consensus dynamics with respect to the presence of an adversary. We first show that interconnections with an adversary, with linear dynamics, can make the consensus dynamics diverge, or drive its evolution to a state different from the average.We then introduce a second network, interconnected with the original network via an engagement topology. This network has no information about the adversary and each agent in it has only access to partial information about the state of the other network. We introduce a dynamics on the coupled network which corresponds to a saddle-point dynamics of a certain zero-sum game and is distributed over each network, as well as the engagement topology. We show that, by appropriately choosing a design parameter corresponding to the competition between these two networks, the coupled dynamics can be made resilient with respect to the presence of the adversary.Our technical approach combines notions of graph theory and stable perturbations of nonsymmetric matrices.We demonstrate our results on an example of kinematic-based flocking in presence of an adversary.