Biblio
Cybercrime has been regarded understandably as a consequent compromise that follows the advent and perceived success of the computer and internet technologies. Equally effecting the privacy, trust, finance and welfare of the wealthy and low-income individuals and organizations, this menace has shown no indication of slowing down. Reports across the world have consistently shown exponential increase in the numbers and costs of cyber-incidents, and more worriedly low conviction rates of cybercriminals, over the years. Stakeholders increasingly explore ways to keep up with containing cyber-incidents by devising tools and techniques to increase the overall efficiency of investigations, but the gap keeps getting wider. However, criminal profiling - an investigative technique that has been proven to provide accurate and valuable directions to traditional crime investigations - has not seen a widespread application, including a formal methodology, to cybercrime investigations due to difficulties in its seamless transference. This paper, in a bid to address this problem, seeks to preliminarily identify the exact benefits criminal profiling has brought to successful traditional crime investigations and the benefits it can translate to cybercrime investigations, identify the challenges posed by the cyber-scene to its implementation in cybercrime investigations, and proffer a practicable solution.
Over the years cybercriminals have misused the Domain Name System (DNS) - a critical component of the Internet - to gain profit. Despite this persisting trend, little empirical information about the security of Top-Level Domains (TLDs) and of the overall 'health' of the DNS ecosystem exists. In this paper, we present security metrics for this ecosystem and measure the operational values of such metrics using three representative phishing and malware datasets. We benchmark entire TLDs against the rest of the market. We explicitly distinguish these metrics from the idea of measuring security performance, because the measured values are driven by multiple factors, not just by the performance of the particular market player. We consider two types of security metrics: occurrence of abuse and persistence of abuse. In conjunction, they provide a good understanding of the overall health of a TLD. We demonstrate that attackers abuse a variety of free services with good reputation, affecting not only the reputation of those services, but of entire TLDs. We find that, when normalized by size, old TLDs like .com host more bad content than new generic TLDs. We propose a statistical regression model to analyze how the different properties of TLD intermediaries relate to abuse counts. We find that next to TLD size, abuse is positively associated with domain pricing (i.e. registries who provide free domain registrations witness more abuse). Last but not least, we observe a negative relation between the DNSSEC deployment rate and the count of phishing domains.
Over the years cybercriminals have misused the Domain Name System (DNS) - a critical component of the Internet - to gain profit. Despite this persisting trend, little empirical information about the security of Top-Level Domains (TLDs) and of the overall 'health' of the DNS ecosystem exists. In this paper, we present security metrics for this ecosystem and measure the operational values of such metrics using three representative phishing and malware datasets. We benchmark entire TLDs against the rest of the market. We explicitly distinguish these metrics from the idea of measuring security performance, because the measured values are driven by multiple factors, not just by the performance of the particular market player. We consider two types of security metrics: occurrence of abuse and persistence of abuse. In conjunction, they provide a good understanding of the overall health of a TLD. We demonstrate that attackers abuse a variety of free services with good reputation, affecting not only the reputation of those services, but of entire TLDs. We find that, when normalized by size, old TLDs like .com host more bad content than new generic TLDs. We propose a statistical regression model to analyze how the different properties of TLD intermediaries relate to abuse counts. We find that next to TLD size, abuse is positively associated with domain pricing (i.e. registries who provide free domain registrations witness more abuse). Last but not least, we observe a negative relation between the DNSSEC deployment rate and the count of phishing domains.
Crypto-ransomware is a challenging threat that ciphers a user's files while hiding the decryption key until a ransom is paid by the victim. This type of malware is a lucrative business for cybercriminals, generating millions of dollars annually. The spread of ransomware is increasing as traditional detection-based protection, such as antivirus and anti-malware, has proven ineffective at preventing attacks. Additionally, this form of malware is incorporating advanced encryption algorithms and expanding the number of file types it targets. Cybercriminals have found a lucrative market and no one is safe from being the next victim. Encrypting ransomware targets business small and large as well as the regular home user. This paper discusses ransomware methods of infection, technology behind it and what can be done to help prevent becoming the next victim. The paper investigates the most common types of crypto-ransomware, various payload methods of infection, typical behavior of crypto ransomware, its tactics, how an attack is ordinarily carried out, what files are most commonly targeted on a victim's computer, and recommendations for prevention and safeguards are listed as well.
Cybersecurity is a problem of growing relevance that impacts all facets of society. As a result, many researchers have become interested in studying cybercriminals and online hacker communities in order to develop more effective cyber defenses. In particular, analysis of hacker community contents may reveal existing and emerging threats that pose great risk to individuals, businesses, and government. Thus, we are interested in developing an automated methodology for identifying tangible and verifiable evidence of potential threats within hacker forums, IRC channels, and carding shops. To identify threats, we couple machine learning methodology with information retrieval techniques. Our approach allows us to distill potential threats from the entirety of collected hacker contents. We present several examples of identified threats found through our analysis techniques. Results suggest that hacker communities can be analyzed to aid in cyber threat detection, thus providing promising direction for future work.
The modern malware poses serious security threats because of its evolved capability of using staged and persistent attack while remaining undetected over a long period of time to perform a number of malicious activities. The challenge for malicious actors is to gain initial control of the victim's machine by bypassing all the security controls. The most favored bait often used by attackers is to deceive users through a trusting or interesting email containing a malicious attachment or a malicious link. To make the email credible and interesting the cybercriminals often perform reconnaissance activities to find background information on the potential target. To this end, the value of information found on the discarded or stolen storage devices is often underestimated or ignored. In this paper, we present the partial results of analysis of one such hard disk that was purchased from the open market. The data found on the disk contained highly sensitive personal and organizational data. The results from the case study will be useful in not only understanding the involved risk but also creating awareness of related threats.