Biblio

Pairing is carried out by two steps, Miller loop and final exponentiation. In this manuscript, the authors propose an efficient Miller loop for a pairing on the FK12 curve. A Hamming weight and bit-length of loop parameter have a great effect on the computational cost of Miller loop. Optimal-ate pairing is used as the most efficient pairing on the FK12 curve currently. The loop parameter of optimal-ate pairing is 6z+2 where z is the integer to make the FK12 curve parameter. Our method uses z which has a shorter bit-length than the previous optimal-ate pairing as the loop parameter. Usually, z has a low Hamming weight to make final exponentiation efficient. Therefore, the loop parameter in our method has a lower Hamming weight than the loop parameter of the previous one in many cases. The authors evaluate our method by the number of multiplications and execution time. As a result, the proposed algorithm leads to the 3.71% reduction in the number of multiplications and the 3.38% reduction in the execution time.

Encryption has become an important need for each and every data transmission. Large amount of delicate data is transferred regularly through different computer networks such as e-banking, email applications and file exchange. Cryptanalysis is study of analyzing the hidden information in the system. The process of cryptanalysis could be done by various features such as power, sound, electromagnetic radiation etc. Lightweight cryptography plays an important role in the IoT devices. It includes various appliances, vehicles, smart sensors and RFID-tags (RFID). PRESENT is one such algorithm, designed for resource constrained devices. This requires less memory and consumes less power. The project propounds a model in which the cryptographic keys are analyzed by the trace of power.

We consider a one-time digital signature scheme recently proposed by Persichetti and show that a successful key recovery attack can be mounted with limited complexity. The attack we propose exploits a single signature intercepted by the attacker, and relies on a statistical analysis performed over such a signature, followed by information set decoding. We assess the attack complexity and show that a full recovery of the secret key can be performed with a work factor that is far below the claimed security level. The efficiency of the attack is motivated by the sparsity of the signature, which leads to a significant information leakage about the secret key.

Side Channel Attacks (SCA) using power measurements are a known method of breaking cryptographic algorithms such as AES. Published research into attacks on AES frequently target only AES-128, and often target only the core Electronic Code-Book (ECB) algorithm, without discussing surrounding issues such as triggering, along with breaking the initialization vector. This paper demonstrates a complete attack on a secure bootloader, where the firmware files have been encrypted with AES-256-CBC. A classic Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack is performed on AES-256 to recover the complete 32-byte key, and a CPA attack is also used to attempt recovery of the initialization vector (IV).