Biblio

The test of security primitives is particularly strategic as any bias coming from the implementation or environment can wreck havoc on the security it is intended to provide. This paper presents how some security properties are tested on leading primitives: True Random Number Generation (TRNG), Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), cryptographic primitives and Digital Sensor (DS). The test of TRNG and PUF to ensure a high level of security is mainly about the entropy assessment, which requires specific statistical tests. The security against side-channel analysis (SCA) of cryptographic primitives, like the substitution box in symmetric cryptography, is generally ensured by masking. But the hardware implementation of masking can be damaged by glitches, which create leakages on sensitive variables. A test method is to search for nets of the cryptographic netlist, which are vulnerable to glitches. The DS is an efficient primitive to detect disturbances and rise alarms in case of fault injection attack (FIA). The dimensioning of this primitive requires a precise test to take into account the environment variations including the aging.

Internet is facing many challenges that cannot be solved easily through ad hoc patches. To address these challenges, many research programs and projects have been initiated and many solutions are being proposed. However, before we have a new architecture that can motivate Internet service providers (ISPs) to deploy and evolve, we need to address two issues: 1) know the current status better by appropriately evaluating the existing Internet; and 2) find how various incentives and strategies will affect the deployment of the new architecture. For the first issue, we define a series of quantitative metrics that can potentially unify results from several measurement projects using different approaches and can be an intrinsic part of future Internet architecture (FIA) for monitoring and evaluation. Using these metrics, we systematically evaluate the current interdomain routing system and reveal many “autonomous-system-level” observations and key lessons for new Internet architectures. Particularly, the evaluation results reveal the imbalance underlying the interdomain routing system and how the deployment of FIAs can benefit from these findings. With these findings, for the second issue, appropriate deployment strategies of the future architecture changes can be formed with balanced incentives for both customers and ISPs. The results can be used to shape the short- and long-term goals for new architectures that are simple evolutions of the current Internet (so-called dirty-slate architectures) and to some extent to clean-slate architectures.