Biblio

Shipboard marine radar systems are essential for safe navigation, helping seafarers perceive their surroundings as they provide bearing and range estimations, object detection, and tracking. Since onboard systems have become increasingly digitized, interconnecting distributed electronics, radars have been integrated into modern bridge systems. But digitization increases the risk of cyberattacks, especially as vessels cannot be considered air-gapped. Consequently, in-depth security is crucial. However, particularly radar systems are not sufficiently protected against harmful network-level adversaries. Therefore, we ask: Can seafarers believe their eyes? In this paper, we identify possible attacks on radar communication and discuss how these threaten safe vessel operation in an attack taxonomy. Furthermore, we develop a holistic simulation environment with radar, complementary nautical sensors, and prototypically implemented cyberattacks from our taxonomy. Finally, leveraging this environment, we create a comprehensive dataset (RadarPWN) with radar network attacks that provides a foundation for future security research to secure marine radar communication.

Compressive Sampling and Sparse reconstruction theory is applied to a linearly frequency modulated continuous wave hybrid lidar/radar system. The goal is to show that high resolution time of flight measurements to underwater targets can be obtained utilizing far fewer samples than dictated by Nyquist sampling theorems. Traditional mixing/down-conversion and matched filter signal processing methods are reviewed and compared to the Compressive Sampling and Sparse Reconstruction methods. Simulated evidence is provided to show the possible sampling rate reductions, and experiments are used to observe the effects that turbid underwater environments have on recovery. Results show that by using compressive sensing theory and sparse reconstruction, it is possible to achieve significant sample rate reduction while maintaining centimeter range resolution.