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2022-07-14
Papaspirou, Vassilis, Maglaras, Leandros, Ferrag, Mohamed Amine, Kantzavelou, Ioanna, Janicke, Helge, Douligeris, Christos.  2021.  A novel Two-Factor HoneyToken Authentication Mechanism. 2021 International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN). :1–7.
The majority of systems rely on user authentication on passwords, but passwords have so many weaknesses and widespread use that easily raise significant security concerns, regardless of their encrypted form. Users hold the same password for different accounts, administrators never check password files for flaws that might lead to a successful cracking, and the lack of a tight security policy regarding regular password replacement are a few problems that need to be addressed. The proposed research work aims at enhancing this security mechanism, prevent penetrations, password theft, and attempted break-ins towards securing computing systems. The selected solution approach is two-folded; it implements a two-factor authentication scheme to prevent unauthorized access, accompanied by Honeyword principles to detect corrupted or stolen tokens. Both can be integrated into any platform or web application with the use of QR codes and a mobile phone.
2017-02-23
B. Yang, E. Martiri.  2015.  "Using Honey Templates to Augment Hash Based Biometric Template Protection". 2015 IEEE 39th Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference. 3:312-316.

Hash based biometric template protection schemes (BTPS), such as fuzzy commitment, fuzzy vault, and secure sketch, address the privacy leakage concern on the plain biometric template storage in a database through using cryptographic hash calculation for template verification. However, cryptographic hashes have only computational security whose being cracked shall leak the biometric feature in these BTPS; and furthermore, existing BTPS are rarely able to detect during a verification process whether a probe template has been leaked from the database or not (i.e., being used by an imposter or a genuine user). In this paper we tailor the "honeywords" idea, which was proposed to detect the hashed password cracking, to enable the detectability of biometric template database leakage. However, unlike passwords, biometric features encoded in a template cannot be renewed after being cracked and thus not straightforwardly able to be protected by the honeyword idea. To enable the honeyword idea on biometrics, diversifiability (and thus renewability) is required on the biometric features. We propose to use BTPS for his purpose in this paper and present a machine learning based protected template generation protocol to ensure the best anonymity of the generated sugar template (from a user's genuine biometric feature) among other honey ones (from synthesized biometric features).