Biblio

In operation centers, it is important to know the power transfer limit to guarantee the safety operation of the power system. The Voltage Stability Margin (VSM) is a widely used measure and needs to definition of a load growth direction (LGD) to be computed. However, different definitions of LGD can provide different VSMs and then the VSM may not be reliable. Besides, the measure of this power transfer limit usually is related to the Saddle-Node Bifurcation. In dynamic security assessment (DSA) is highly desirable to identify limit regions where the power system can operate safely due to Hopf (HB) and Saddle-Node (SNB) Bifurcations. This paper presents a modeling of the power system incorporating the LGD variation based on participation factors to evaluate the effects on the stability margin estimation due to HB and SNB. A direct method is used to calculate the stability margin of the power system for a given load direction. The analysis was performed in the IEEE 39 bus system.

This paper provides a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) metric-based technique for classifying and analysing the prevailing Computer Network Security Vulnerabilities and Threats (CNSVT). The problem that is addressed in this paper, is that, at the time of writing this paper, there existed no effective approaches for analysing and classifying CNSVT for purposes of assessments based on CVSS metrics. The authors of this paper have achieved this by generating a CVSS metric-based dynamic Vulnerability Analysis Classification Countermeasure (VACC) criterion that is able to rank vulnerabilities. The CVSS metric-based VACC has allowed the computation of vulnerability Similarity Measure (VSM) using the Hamming and Euclidean distance metric functions. Nevertheless, the CVSS-metric based on VACC also enabled the random measuring of the VSM for a selected number of vulnerabilities based on the [Ma-Ma], [Ma-Mi], [Mi-Ci], [Ma-Ci] ranking score. This is a technique that is aimed at allowing security experts to be able to conduct proper vulnerability detection and assessments across computer-based networks based on the perceived occurrence by checking the probability that given threats will occur or not. The authors have also proposed high-level countermeasures of the vulnerabilities that have been listed. The authors have evaluated the CVSS-metric based VACC and the results are promising. Based on this technique, it is worth noting that these propositions can help in the development of stronger computer and network security tools.

Summary form only given. All-optical switching (AOS) has been observed in ferromagnetic (FM) layers and synthetic ferrimagnetic heterostructures [1-4]. In this work, we use anomalous Hall effect (AHE) measurements to demonstrate controlled helicity-dependent switching in synthetic ferrimagnetic heterostructures. The two FM layers are engineered to have different Curie temperatures Tc1 (fixed) and Tc2 (variable). We show that irrespective of whether Tc2 is higher or lower than Tc1, the final magnetic configuration of the heterostructure is controlled by using the laser polarization to set the magnetic state of the FM layer with the highest Tc. All samples were grown on glass substrates at room temperature by DC magnetron sputtering. Two sets of samples were prepared. The first set are single FM layers with layer composition Ta (3 nm)/Pt (4 nm)/FM1(2)/Pt capping (4 nm), where FM1 = Co (0.6 nm) is a Co layer and FM2 = CoFeB (tCoFeB)/Pt(0.4 nm)/ CoFeB (tCoFeB) (0.2 ≤ tCoFeB ≤ 0.6 nm) is a composite CoFeB layer where both CoFeB layers are ferromagnetically coupled and act as a single layer. FM1 and FM2 were used to produce the second set of synthetic ferrimagnetic samples with layer structure Ta (3 nm)/Pt (4 nm)/FM1/Pt (0.4 nm)/Ru (0.9 nm)/Pt (0.4 nm)/FM2/Pt capping (4 nm). The Ru layer provides the antiferromagnetic RKKY interlayer exchange coupling between the adjacent FM1 and FM2 layers while the Pt layers on either side of the Ru layer can tune the strength of the coupling and stabilize their perpendicular anisotropy [5]. To study the AOS, we use a Ti: sapphire fs-laser with a wavelength of 800 nm and a pulse duration of 43 fs. A quarter-wave plate is used to create a circularly polarized [right(σ+) and left-handed (σ-)] beam. We first measured the magnetic properties of the FM1 and FM2 layers using vibrating sample magnetometry (VSM). All FM samples show full remanence in perpendicular hyst- resis loops at room temperature (not shown). The temperature-dependent magnetization scans (not shown) give a Curie temperature Tc1 of 524 K for FM1. For FM2, increasing tCoFeB increases its Curie temperatureTc2. At tCoFeB = 0.5 nm, Tc2 - Tc1. Hall crosses are patterned by optical lithography and ion milling. The width of the current carrying wire is - 5 um, giving a DC current density of - 6 x 109 A/m2 during the measurement. Figure 1(a) shows the resulting perpendicular Hall hysteresis loop of the synthetic ferrimagnetic sample with tCoFeB = 0.2 nm. At remanence, the stable magnetic configurations are the two antiparallel orientations of FM1 and FM2 [State I and II in Fig. 1(a)]. To study the AOS, we swept the laser beam with a power of 0.45 mW and a speed of 1 μm/sec across the Hall cross, and the corresponding Hall voltage was constantly monitored. In Fig. 1(b), we show the normalized Hall voltage, VHall, as a function of the laser beam position x for both beam polarizations σ+ and σ-. The initial magnetic configuration was State I. When the beam is at the center of the cross (position B), both beam polarizations give VHall - 0. As the beam leaves the cross (position C), the σbeam changes the magnetic configurations from State I to State II (FM1 magnetization pointing down), while the system reverts to State I using the σ+ beam. Changing the initial configuration from State I to State II results in the same final magnetic configurations, determined by the laser beam polarizations (not shown). Similar results (not shown) were obtained for samples with tCoFeB ≤ 0.4 nm. However, at tCoFeB = 0.6 nm, the σbeam results in the final magnetic configurations with FM2 magnetization pointing down (State I) and the σ+ beam results in the State II configuration, suggesting that the final state is determined by the beam polar

Language vector space models (VSMs) have recently proven to be effective across a variety of tasks. In VSMs, each word in a corpus is represented as a real-valued vector. These vectors can be used as features in many applications in machine learning and natural language processing. In this paper, we study the effect of vector space representations in cyber security. In particular, we consider a passive traffic analysis attack (Website Fingerprinting) that threatens users' navigation privacy on the web. By using anonymous communication, Internet users (such as online activists) may wish to hide the destination of web pages they access for different reasons such as avoiding tyrant governments. Traditional website fingerprinting studies collect packets from the users' network and extract features that are used by machine learning techniques to reveal the destination of certain web pages. In this work, we propose the packet to vector (P2V) approach where we model website fingerprinting attack using word vector representations. We show how the suggested model outperforms previous website fingerprinting works.

Language vector space models (VSMs) have recently proven to be effective across a variety of tasks. In VSMs, each word in a corpus is represented as a real-valued vector. These vectors can be used as features in many applications in machine learning and natural language processing. In this paper, we study the effect of vector space representations in cyber security. In particular, we consider a passive traffic analysis attack (Website Fingerprinting) that threatens users' navigation privacy on the web. By using anonymous communication, Internet users (such as online activists) may wish to hide the destination of web pages they access for different reasons such as avoiding tyrant governments. Traditional website fingerprinting studies collect packets from the users' network and extract features that are used by machine learning techniques to reveal the destination of certain web pages. In this work, we propose the packet to vector (P2V) approach where we model website fingerprinting attack using word vector representations. We show how the suggested model outperforms previous website fingerprinting works.