Biblio

In order to ensure the security of information assets and standardize the risk assessment and inspection workflow of information assets. This paper has designed and developed a risk assessment system for information and communication equipment with simple operation, offline assessment, and diversified external interfaces. The process of risk assessment can be realized, which effectively improves the efficiency of risk assessment.

The inforrmation age continues to transform the mechanics of integrating electric power devices and systems, from coordinated operations based purely on the physics of electric power engineering to an increasing blend of power with information and communication technology. Integrating electric system components is not just about attaching wires. It requires the connection of computer-based automation systems to associated sensing and communication equipment. The architectural impacts are significant. Well-considered and commonly held concepts, principles, and organizational structures continue to emerge to address the complexity of the integrated operational challenges that drive our society to expect more flexibility in configuring the electric power system, while simultaneously achieving greater efficiency, reliability, and resilience. Architectural concepts, such as modularity and composability, contribute to the creation of structures that enable the connection of power system equipment characterized by clearly defined interfaces consisting of physical and cyberlinks. The result of successful electric power system component connection is interoperation: the discipline that drives integration to be simple and reliable.

The communication infrastructure is a key element for management and control of the power system in the smart grid. The communication infrastructure, which can include equipment using off-the-shelf vulnerable operating systems, has the potential to increase the attack surface of the power system. The interdependency between the communication and the power system renders the management of the overall security risk a challenging task. In this paper, we address this issue by presenting a mathematical model for identifying and hardening the most critical communication equipment used in the power system. Using non-cooperative game theory, we model interactions between an attacker and a defender. We derive the minimum defense resources required and the optimal strategy of the defender that minimizes the risk on the power system. Finally, we evaluate the correctness and the efficiency of our model via a case study.