Biblio

Recognizing the need for proactive analysis of cyber adversary behavior, this paper presents a new event-driven simulation model and implementation to reveal the efforts needed by attackers who have various entry points into a network. Unlike previous models which focus on the impact of attackers' actions on the defender's infrastructure, this work focuses on the attackers' strategies and actions. By operating on a request-response session level, our model provides an abstraction of how the network infrastructure reacts to access credentials the adversary might have obtained through a variety of strategies. We present the current capabilities of the simulator by showing three variants of Bronze Butler APT on a network with different user access levels.

This paper presents a novel game theoretic attack-defence decision making framework for cyber-physical system (CPS) security. Game theory is a powerful tool to analyse the interaction between the attacker and the defender in such scenarios. In the formulation of games, participants are usually assumed to be rational. They will always choose the action to pursuit maximum payoff according to the knowledge of the strategic situation they are in. However, in reality the capacity of rationality is often bounded by the level of intelligence, computational resources and the amount of available information. This paper formulates the concept of bounded rationality into the decision making process, in order to optimise the defender's strategy considering that the defender and the attacker have incomplete information of each other and limited computational capacity. Under the proposed framework, the defender can often benefit from deviating from the minimax Nash Equilibrium strategy, the theoretically expected outcome of rational game playing. Numerical results are presented and discussed in order to demonstrate the proposed technique.

Network architecture design and verification has become increasingly complicated as a greater number of security considerations, implementations, and factors are included in the design process. In the design process, one must account for various costs of interwoven layers of security. Generally these costs are simplified for evaluation of risk to the network. The obvious implications of adding security are the need to account for the impacts of loss (risk) and accounting for the ensuing increased design costs. The considerations that are not traditionally examined are those of the adversary and the defender of a given system. Without accounting for the view point of the individuals interacting with a network architecture, one can not verify and select the most advantageous security implementation. This work presents a method for obtaining a security metric that takes into account not only the risk of the defender, but also the probability of an attack originating from the motivation of the adversary. We then move to a more meaningful metric based on a monetary unit that architects can use in choosing a best fit solution for a given network critical path design problem.

Large-scale infrastructures are critical to economic and social development, and hence their continued performance and security are of high national importance. Such an infrastructure often is a system of systems, and its functionality critically depends on the inherent robustness of its constituent systems and its defense strategy for countering attacks. Additionally, interdependencies between the systems play another critical role in determining the infrastructure robustness specified by its survival probability. In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models between a defender and an attacker for a generic system of systems using inherent parameters and conditional survival probabilities that characterize the interdependencies. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions for the cases of interdependent and independent systems of systems under sum-form utility functions. We derive expressions for the infrastructure survival probability that capture its dependence on cost and system parameters, and also on dependencies that are specified by conditional probabilities. We apply the results to cyber-physical systems which show the effects on system survival probability due to defense and attack intensities, inherent robustness, unit cost, target valuation, and interdependencies.

The rate at which cyber-attacks are increasing globally portrays a terrifying picture upfront. The main dynamics of such attacks could be studied in terms of the actions of attackers and defenders in a cyber-security game. However currently little research has taken place to study such interactions. In this paper we use behavioral game theory and try to investigate the role of certain actions taken by attackers and defenders in a simulated cyber-attack scenario of defacing a website. We choose a Reinforcement Learning (RL) model to represent a simulated attacker and a defender in a 2×4 cyber-security game where each of the 2 players could take up to 4 actions. A pair of model participants were computationally simulated across 1000 simulations where each pair played at most 30 rounds in the game. The goal of the attacker was to deface the website and the goal of the defender was to prevent the attacker from doing so. Our results show that the actions taken by both the attackers and defenders are a function of attention paid by these roles to their recently obtained outcomes. It was observed that if attacker pays more attention to recent outcomes then he is more likely to perform attack actions. We discuss the implication of our results on the evolution of dynamics between attackers and defenders in cyber-security games.