Biblio

With the development of big data and machine learning techniques, medical data sharing for the use of disease diagnosis has received considerable attention. Blockchain, as an emerging technology, has been widely used to resolve the efficiency and security issues in medical data sharing. However, the existing studies on blockchain-based medical data sharing have rarely concerned about the reasonable incentive mechanism. In this paper, we propose a cooperation model where medical data is shared via blockchain. We derive the topological relationships among the participants consisting of data owners, miners and third parties, and gradually develop the computational process of Shapley value revenue distribution. Specifically, we explore the revenue distribution under different consensuses of blockchain. Finally, we demonstrate the incentive effect and rationality of the proposed solution by analyzing the revenue distribution.

Fractional hedonic games (FHGs) are extensively studied in game theory and explain the formation of coalitions among individuals in a group. This paper investigates the coalition generation problem, namely, finding a coalition structure whose social welfare, i.e., the sum of the players' payoffs, is maximized. We focus on agent-based methods which set the decision rules for each player in the game. Through repeated interactions the players arrive at a coalition structure. In particular, we propose CFSV, namely, coalition formation with Shapley value-based welfare distribution scheme. To evaluate CFSV, we theoretically demonstrate that this algorithm achieves optimal coalition structure over certain standard graph classes and empirically compare the algorithm against other existing benchmarks on real-world and synthetic graphs. The results show that CFSV is able to achieve superior performance.

The stability and effectiveness of supply chain financing union are directly affected by income fluctuation and unequal distribution problems, subsequently making the economic interests of the involved parties impacted. In this paper, the incomes of the parties in the union were distributed using Shapley value from the perspective of cooperative game under the background of the supply chain financing based on third-party trading platform, and then correction factors were weighted by introducing risk correction factors and combining with analytic hierarchy process (AHP), in order to improve the original model. Finally, the feasibility of the scheme was proved using example.