Biblio

The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of embedded devices that sense and manage our environment in a growing range of applications. Large-scale IoT systems such as smart cities require significant investment in both equipment and personnel. To maximize return on investment, IoT platforms should support multiple third-party applications and adaptation of infrastructure over time. Realizing the vision of shared IoT platforms demands strong security guarantees. That is particularly challenging considering the limited capability and resource constraints of many IoT devices. In this paper, we present SPEED, an approach to secure erasure with verifiability in IoT. Secure erasure is a fundamental property when it comes to share an IoT platform with other users which guarantees the cleanness of a device's memory at the beginning of the application deployment as well as at the time of releasing the underlying IoT device. SPEED relies on two security primitives: memory isolation and distance bounding protocol. We evaluate the performance of SPEED by implementing it on a simple bare-metal IoT device belongs to Class-1. Our evaluation results show a limited overhead in terms of memory footprint, time, and energy consumption.

Contactless communications have become omnipresent in our daily lives, from simple access cards to electronic passports. Such systems are particularly vulnerable to relay attacks, in which an adversary relays the messages from a prover to a verifier. Distance-bounding protocols were introduced to counter such attacks. Lately, there has been a very active research trend on improving the security of these protocols, but also on ensuring strong privacy properties with respect to active adversaries and malicious verifiers. In particular, a difficult threat to address is the terrorist fraud, in which a far-away prover cooperates with a nearby accomplice to fool a verifier. The usual defence against this attack is to make it impossible for the accomplice to succeed unless the prover provides him with enough information to recover his secret key and impersonate him later on. However, the mere existence of a long-term secret key is problematic with respect to privacy. In this paper, we propose a novel approach in which the prover does not leak his secret key but a reusable session key along with a group signature on it. This allows the adversary to impersonate him even without knowing his signature key. Based on this approach, we give the first distance-bounding protocol, called SPADE, integrating anonymity, revocability and provable resistance to standard threat models.