Biblio

Cyberspace is vulnerable to continuous malicious attacks. Traceability of network attacks is an effective defense means to curb and counter network attacks. In this paper, the evolutionary game model is used to analyze the network attack and defense behavior. On the basis of the quantification of attack and defense benefits, the replication dynamic learning mechanism is used to describe the change process of the selection probability of attack and defense strategies, and finally the evolutionary stability strategies and their solution curves of both sides are obtained. On this basis, the attack behavior is analyzed, and the probability curve of attack strategy and the optimal attack strategy are obtained, so as to realize the effective traceability of attack behavior.

Recommender systems have become quite popular recently. However, such systems are vulnerable to several types of attacks that target user ratings. One such attack is the Sybil attack where an entity masquerades as several identities with the intention of diverting user ratings. In this work, we propose evolutionary game theory as a possible solution to the Sybil attack in recommender systems. After modeling the attack, we use replicator dynamics to solve for evolutionary stable strategies. Our results show that under certain conditions that are easily achievable by a system administrator, the probability of an attack strategy drops to zero implying degraded fitness for Sybil nodes that eventually die out.