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Filters: Keyword is wearable device security  [Clear All Filters]
2017-12-20
Yin, S., Bae, C., Kim, S. J., Seo, J. s.  2017.  Designing ECG-based physical unclonable function for security of wearable devices. 2017 39th Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society (EMBC). :3509–3512.

As a plethora of wearable devices are being introduced, significant concerns exist on the privacy and security of personal data stored on these devices. Expanding on recent works of using electrocardiogram (ECG) as a modality for biometric authentication, in this work, we investigate the possibility of using personal ECG signals as the individually unique source for physical unclonable function (PUF), which eventually can be used as the key for encryption and decryption engines. We present new signal processing and machine learning algorithms that learn and extract maximally different ECG features for different individuals and minimally different ECG features for the same individual over time. Experimental results with a large 741-subject in-house ECG database show that the distributions of the intra-subject (same person) Hamming distance of extracted ECG features and the inter-subject Hamming distance have minimal overlap. 256-b random numbers generated from the ECG features of 648 (out of 741) subjects pass the NIST randomness tests.

2017-05-17
Snader, Robin, Kravets, Robin, Harris, III, Albert F..  2016.  CryptoCoP: Lightweight, Energy-efficient Encryption and Privacy for Wearable Devices. Proceedings of the 2016 Workshop on Wearable Systems and Applications. :7–12.

As people use and interact with more and more wearables and IoT-enabled devices, their private information is being exposed without any privacy protections. However, the limited capabilities of IoT devices makes implementing robust privacy protections challenging. In response, we present CryptoCoP, an energy-efficient, content agnostic privacy and encryption protocol for IoT devices. Eavesdroppers cannot snoop on data protected by CryptoCoP or track users via their IoT devices. We evaluate CryptoCoP and show that the performance and energy overheads are viable in a wide variety of situations, and can be modified to trade off forward secrecy and energy consumption against required key storage on the device.