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2019-06-17
Miedl, Philipp, Thiele, Lothar.  2018.  The Security Risks of Power Measurements in Multicores. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. :1585-1592.

Two of the main goals of power management in modern multicore processors are reducing the average power dissipation and delivering the maximum performance up to the physical limits of the system, when demanded. To achieve these goals, hardware manufacturers and operating system providers include sophisticated power and performance management systems, which require detailed information about the current processor state. For example, Intel processors offer the possibility to measure the power dissipation of the processor. In this work, we are evaluating whether such power measurements can be used to establish a covert channel between two isolated applications on the same system; the power covert channel. We present a detailed theoretical and experimental evaluation of the power covert channel on two platforms based on Intel processors. Our theoretical analysis is based on detailed modelling and allows us to derive a channel capacity bound for each platform. Moreover, we conduct an extensive experimental study under controlled, yet realistic, conditions. Our study shows, that the platform dependent channel capacities are in the order of 2000 bps and that it is possible to achieve throughputs of up to 1000 bps with a bit error probability of less than 15%, using a simple implementation. This illustrates the potential of leaking sensitive information and breaking a systems security framework using a covert channel based on power measurements.

2017-05-18
Bartolini, Davide B., Miedl, Philipp, Thiele, Lothar.  2016.  On the Capacity of Thermal Covert Channels in Multicores. Proceedings of the Eleventh European Conference on Computer Systems. :24:1–24:16.

Modern multicore processors feature easily accessible temperature sensors that provide useful information for dynamic thermal management. These sensors were recently shown to be a potential security threat, since otherwise isolated applications can exploit them to establish a thermal covert channel and leak restricted information. Previous research showed experiments that document the feasibility of (low-rate) communication over this channel, but did not further analyze its fundamental characteristics. For this reason, the important questions of quantifying the channel capacity and achievable rates remain unanswered. To address these questions, we devise and exploit a new methodology that leverages both theoretical results from information theory and experimental data to study these thermal covert channels on modern multicores. We use spectral techniques to analyze data from two representative platforms and estimate the capacity of the channels from a source application to temperature sensors on the same or different cores. We estimate the capacity to be in the order of 300 bits per second (bps) for the same-core channel, i.e., when reading the temperature on the same core where the source application runs, and in the order of 50 bps for the 1-hop channel, i.e., when reading the temperature of the core physically next to the one where the source application runs. Moreover, we show a communication scheme that achieves rates of more than 45 bps on the same-core channel and more than 5 bps on the 1-hop channel, with less than 1% error probability. The highest rate shown in previous work was 1.33 bps on the 1-hop channel with 11% error probability.