Biblio

The mobile ad-hoc networks comprised of nodes that are communicated through dynamic request and also by static table driven technique. The dynamic route discovery in AODV routing creates an unsecure transmission as well as reception. The reason for insecurity is the route request is given to all the nodes in the network communication. The possibility of the intruder nodes are more in the case of dynamic route request. Wormhole attacks in MANETs are creating challenges in the field of network analysis. In this paper the wormhole scenario is realized using high power transmission. This is implemented using energy model of ns2 simulator. The Apptool simulator identifies the energy level of each node and track the node of high transmission power. The performance curves for throughput, node energy for different encrypted values, packet drop ratio, and end to end delay are plotted.

The internet of things (IoT) is the popular wireless network for data collection applications. The IoT networks are deployed in dense or sparse architectures, out of which the dense networks are vastly popular as these are capable of gathering the huge volumes of data. The collected data is analyzed using the historical or continuous analytical systems, which uses the back testing or time-series analytics to observe the desired patterns from the target data. The lost or bad interval data always carries the high probability to misguide the analysis reports. The data is lost due to a variety of reasons, out of which the most popular ones are associated with the node failures and connectivity holes, which occurs due to physical damage, software malfunctioning, blackhole/wormhole attacks, route poisoning, etc. In this paper, the work is carried on the new routing scheme for the IoTs to avoid the connectivity holes, which analyzes the activity of wireless nodes and takes the appropriate actions when required.

Internet of Things is attracting a lot of interest in the modern world and has become a part of daily life leading to a large scale of distribution of Low power and Lossy Networks (LLN). For such networks constrained by low power and storage, IETF has proposed RPL an open standard routing protocol. However RPL protocol is exposed to a number of attacks which may degrade the performance and resources of the network leading to incorrect output. In this paper, to address Wormhole and Grayhole attack we propose a light weight Trust based mechanism. The proposed method uses direct trust which is computed based on node properties and Indirect Trust which is based on opinion of the neighboring nodes. The proposed method is energy friendly and does not impose excessive overhead on network traffic.

The inherent characteristics of Mobile Ad hoc network (MANET) such as dynamic topology, limited bandwidth, limited power supply, infrastructure less network make themselves attractive for a wide spectrum of applications and vulnerable to security attacks. Sinkhole attack is the most disruptive routing layer attack. Sinkhole nodes attract all the traffic towards them to setup further active attacks such as Black hole, Gray hole and wormhole attacks. Sinkhole nodes need to be isolated from the MANET as early as possible. In this paper, an effective mechanism is proposed to prevent and detect sinkhole and wormhole attacks in MANET. The proposed work detects and punishes the attacker nodes using different techniques such as node collusion technique, which classifies a node as an attacker node only with the agreement with the neighboring nodes. When the node suspects the existence of attacker or sinkhole node in the path, it joins together with neighboring nodes to determine the sinkhole node. In the prevention of routing attacks, the proposed system introduces a route reserve method; new routes learnt are updated in the routing table of the node only after ensuring that the route does not contain the attacker nodes. The proposed system effectively modifies Ad hoc on demand Distance Vector (AODV) with the ability to detect and prevent the sinkhole and wormhole attack, so the modified protocol is named as Attack Aware Alert (A3AODV). The experiments are carried out in NS2 simulator, and the result shows the efficiency in terms of packet delivery ratio and routing overhead.

Networked control systems consist of distributed sensors and actuators that communicate via a wireless network. The use of an open wireless medium and unattended deployment leaves these systems vulnerable to intelligent adversaries whose goal is to disrupt the system performance. In this paper, we study the wormhole attack on a networked control system, in which an adversary establishes a link between two geographically distant regions of the network by using either high-gain antennas, as in the out-of-band wormhole, or colluding network nodes as in the in-band wormhole. Wormholes allow the adversary to violate the timing constraints of real-time control systems by first creating low-latency links, which attract network traffic, and then delaying or dropping packets. Since the wormhole attack reroutes and replays valid messages, it cannot be detected using cryptographic mechanisms alone. We study the impact of the wormhole attack on the network flows and delays and introduce a passivity-based control-theoretic framework for modeling and mitigating the wormhole attack. We develop this framework for both the in-band and out-of-band wormhole attacks as well as complex, hereto-unreported wormhole attacks consisting of arbitrary combinations of in-and out-of band wormholes. By integrating existing mitigation strategies into our framework, we analyze the throughput, delay, and stability properties of the overall system. Through simulation study, we show that, by selectively dropping control packets, the wormhole attack can cause disturbances in the physical plant of a networked control system, and demonstrate that appropriate selection of detection parameters mitigates the disturbances due to the wormhole while satisfying the delay constraints of the physical system.

Networked control systems consist of distributed sensors and actuators that communicate via a wireless network. The use of an open wireless medium and unattended deployment leaves these systems vulnerable to intelligent adversaries whose goal is to disrupt the system performance. In this paper, we study the wormhole attack on a networked control system, in which an adversary establishes a link between two geographically distant regions of the network by using either high-gain antennas, as in the out-of-band wormhole, or colluding network nodes as in the in-band wormhole. Wormholes allow the adversary to violate the timing constraints of real-time control systems by first creating low-latency links, which attract network traffic, and then delaying or dropping packets. Since the wormhole attack reroutes and replays valid messages, it cannot be detected using cryptographic mechanisms alone. We study the impact of the wormhole attack on the network flows and delays and introduce a passivity-based control-theoretic framework for modeling and mitigating the wormhole attack. We develop this framework for both the in-band and out-of-band wormhole attacks as well as complex, hereto-unreported wormhole attacks consisting of arbitrary combinations of in-and out-of band wormholes. By integrating existing mitigation strategies into our framework, we analyze the throughput, delay, and stability properties of the overall system. Through simulation study, we show that, by selectively dropping control packets, the wormhole attack can cause disturbances in the physical plant of a networked control system, and demonstrate that appropriate selection of detection parameters mitigates the disturbances due to the wormhole while satisfying the delay constraints of the physical system.