Biblio
This paper formulates a power system related optimal control problem, motivated by potential cyber-attacks on grid control systems, and ensuing defensive response to such attacks. The problem is formulated as a standard nonlinear program in the GAMS optimization environment, with system dynamics discretized over a short time horizon providing constraint equations, which are then treated via waveform relaxation. Selection of objective function and additional decision variables is explored first for identifying grid vulnerability to cyber-attacks that act by modifying feedback control system parameters. The resulting decisions for the attacker are then fixed, and the optimization problem is modified with a new objective function and decision variables, to explore a defender's possible response to such attacks.
Cyber crime investigation is the integration of two technologies named theoretical methodology and second practical tools. First is the theoretical digital forensic methodology that encompasses the steps to investigate the cyber crime. And second technology is the practically development of the digital forensic tool which sequentially and systematically analyze digital devices to extract the evidence to prove the crime. This paper explores the development of digital forensic framework, combine the advantages of past twenty five forensic models and generate a algorithm to create a new digital forensic model. The proposed model provides the following advantages, a standardized method for investigation, the theory of model can be directly convert into tool, a history lookup facility, cost and time minimization, applicable to any type of digital crime investigation.
We design polynomial time schemes for secure message transmission over arbitrary networks, in the presence of an eavesdropper, and where each edge corresponds to an erasure channel with public feedback. Our schemes are described through linear programming (LP) formulations, that explicitly select (possibly different) sets of paths for key-generation and message sending. Although our LPs are not always capacity-achieving, they outperform the best known alternatives in the literature, and extend to incorporate several interesting scenaria.
In this paper we propose a framework for automating feedback control to balance hard-to-predict wind power variations. The power imbalance is a result of non-zero mean error around the wind power forecast. Our proposed framework is aimed at achieving the objective of frequency stabilization and regulation through one control action. A case-study for a real-world system on Flores island in Portugal is provided. Using a battery-based storage on the island, we illustrate the proposed control framework.
The vast majority of today's critical infrastructure is supported by numerous feedback control loops and an attack on these control loops can have disastrous consequences. This is a major concern since modern control systems are becoming large and decentralized and thus more vulnerable to attacks. This paper is concerned with the estimation and control of linear systems when some of the sensors or actuators are corrupted by an attacker. We give a new simple characterization of the maximum number of attacks that can be detected and corrected as a function of the pair (A,C) of the system and we show in particular that it is impossible to accurately reconstruct the state of a system if more than half the sensors are attacked. In addition, we show how the design of a secure local control loop can improve the resilience of the system. When the number of attacks is smaller than a threshold, we propose an efficient algorithm inspired from techniques in compressed sensing to estimate the state of the plant despite attacks. We give a theoretical characterization of the performance of this algorithm and we show on numerical simulations that the method is promising and allows to reconstruct the state accurately despite attacks. Finally, we consider the problem of designing output-feedback controllers that stabilize the system despite sensor attacks. We show that a principle of separation between estimation and control holds and that the design of resilient output feedback controllers can be reduced to the design of resilient state estimators.