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2021-06-24
Dang, Tran Khanh, Truong, Phat T. Tran, Tran, Pi To.  2020.  Data Poisoning Attack on Deep Neural Network and Some Defense Methods. 2020 International Conference on Advanced Computing and Applications (ACOMP). :15–22.
In recent years, Artificial Intelligence has disruptively changed information technology and software engineering with a proliferation of technologies and applications based-on it. However, recent researches show that AI models in general and the most greatest invention since sliced bread - Deep Learning models in particular, are vulnerable to being hacked and can be misused for bad purposes. In this paper, we carry out a brief review of data poisoning attack - one of the two recently dangerous emerging attacks - and the state-of-the-art defense methods for this problem. Finally, we discuss current challenges and future developments.
2017-05-22
Russu, Paolo, Demontis, Ambra, Biggio, Battista, Fumera, Giorgio, Roli, Fabio.  2016.  Secure Kernel Machines Against Evasion Attacks. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security. :59–69.

Machine learning is widely used in security-sensitive settings like spam and malware detection, although it has been shown that malicious data can be carefully modified at test time to evade detection. To overcome this limitation, adversary-aware learning algorithms have been developed, exploiting robust optimization and game-theoretical models to incorporate knowledge of potential adversarial data manipulations into the learning algorithm. Despite these techniques have been shown to be effective in some adversarial learning tasks, their adoption in practice is hindered by different factors, including the difficulty of meeting specific theoretical requirements, the complexity of implementation, and scalability issues, in terms of computational time and space required during training. In this work, we aim to develop secure kernel machines against evasion attacks that are not computationally more demanding than their non-secure counterparts. In particular, leveraging recent work on robustness and regularization, we show that the security of a linear classifier can be drastically improved by selecting a proper regularizer, depending on the kind of evasion attack, as well as unbalancing the cost of classification errors. We then discuss the security of nonlinear kernel machines, and show that a proper choice of the kernel function is crucial. We also show that unbalancing the cost of classification errors and varying some kernel parameters can further improve classifier security, yielding decision functions that better enclose the legitimate data. Our results on spam and PDF malware detection corroborate our analysis.