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2023-06-16
Zhu, Rongzhen, Wang, Yuchen, Bai, Pengpeng, Liang, Zhiming, Wu, Weiguo, Tang, Lei.  2022.  CPSD: A data security deletion algorithm based on copyback command. 2022 IEEE International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Computer Applications (ICAICA). :1036—1041.
Data secure deletion operation in storage media is an important function of data security management. The internal physical properties of SSDs are different from hard disks, and data secure deletion of disks can not apply to SSDs directly. Copyback operation is used to improve the data migration performance of SSDs but is rarely used due to error accumulation issue. We propose a data securely deletion algorithm based on copyback operation, which improves the efficiency of data secure deletion without affecting the reliability of data. First, this paper proves that the data secure delete operation takes a long time on the channel bus, increasing the I/O overhead, and reducing the performance of the SSDs. Secondly, this paper designs an efficient data deletion algorithm, which can process read requests quickly. The experimental results show that the proposed algorithm can reduce the response time of read requests by 21% and the response time of delete requests by 18.7% over the existing algorithm.
2017-06-05
Chen, Bo, Jia, Shijie, Xia, Luning, Liu, Peng.  2016.  Sanitizing Data is Not Enough!: Towards Sanitizing Structural Artifacts in Flash Media. Proceedings of the 32Nd Annual Conference on Computer Security Applications. :496–507.

Conventional overwriting-based and encryption-based secure deletion schemes can only sanitize data. However, the past existence of the deleted data may leave artifacts in the layout at all layers of a computing system. These structural artifacts may be utilized by the adversary to infer sensitive information about the deleted data or even to fully recover them. The conventional secure deletion solutions unfortunately cannot sanitize them. In this work, we introduce truly secure deletion, a novel security notion that is much stronger than the conventional secure deletion. Truly secure deletion requires sanitizing both the obsolete data as well as the corresponding structural artifacts, so that the resulting storage layout after a delete operation is indistinguishable from that the deleted data never appeared. We propose TedFlash, a Truly secure deletion scheme for Flash-based block devices. TedFlash can successfully sanitize both the data and the structural artifacts, while satisfying the design constraints imposed for flash memory. Security analysis and experimental evaluation show that TedFlash can achieve the truly secure deletion guarantee with a small additional overhead compared to conventional secure deletion solutions.