Biblio

An ideal audio retrieval method should be not only highly efficient in identifying an audio track from a massive audio dataset, but also robust to any distortion. Unfortunately, none of the audio retrieval methods is robust to all types of distortions. An audio retrieval method has to do with both the audio fingerprint and the strategy, especially how they are combined. We argue that the Sampling and Counting Method (SC), a state-of-the-art audio retrieval method, would be promising towards an ideal audio retrieval method, if we could make it robust to time-stretch and pitch-stretch. Towards this objective, this paper proposes a turning point alignment method to enhance SC with resistance to time-stretch, which makes Philips and Philips-like fingerprints resist to time-stretch. Experimental results show that our approach can resist to time-stretch from 70% to 130%, which is on a par to the state-of-the-art methods. It also marginally improves the retrieval performance with various noise distortions.

Biometric authentication schemes are frequently used to establish the identity of a user. Often, a trusted hardware device is used to decide if a provided biometric feature is sufficiently close to the features stored by the legitimate user during enrollment. In this paper, we address the question whether the stored features can be extracted with side-channel attacks. We consider several models for types of leakage that are relevant specifically for fingerprint verification, and show results for attacks against the Bozorth3 and a custom matching algorithm. This work shows an interesting path for future research on the susceptibility of biometric algorithms towards side-channel attacks.