Biblio

Content centric networking (CCN) where content/named data as the first entity has become one of the most promising architectures for the future Internet. To achieve better security, the Interest NACK mechanism is introduced into CCN; however, it has not attracted enough attention and most of the CCN architectures do not embed Interest NACK until now. This study focuses on analysing the urgency of implementing Interest NACK into CCN, by designing a novel network threat named advanced interest flooding attack (AIFA) to attack CCN, which can not only exhaust the pending interest table (PIT) resource of each involved router just as normal interest flooding attack (IFA), but also keep each PIT entry unexpired until it finishes, making it harder to detect and more harmful when compared with the normal IFA. Specifically, the damage of AIFA on CCN architecture with and without Interest NACK is evaluated and analysed, compared with normal IFA, and then the urgency of implementing Interest NACK is highlighted.

In content-based security, encrypted content as well as wrapped access keys are made freely available by an Information Centric Network: Only those clients which are able to unwrap the encryption key can access the protected content. In this paper we extend this model to computation chains where derived data (e.g. produced by a Named Function Network) also has to comply to the content-based security approach. A central problem to solve is the synchronized on-demand publishing of encrypted results and wrapped keys as well as defining the set of consumers which are authorized to access the derived data. In this paper we introduce "content-attendant policies" and report on a running prototype that demonstrates how to enforce data owner-defined access control policies despite fully decentralized and arbitrarily long computation chains.