Biblio

The usage of robot is rapidly growth in our society. The communication link and applications connect the robots to their clients or users. This communication link and applications are normally connected through some kind of network connections. This network system is amenable of being attached and vulnerable to the security threats. It is a critical part for ensuring security and privacy for robotic platforms. The paper, also discusses about several cyber-physical security threats that are only for robotic platforms. The peer to peer applications use in the robotic platforms for threats target integrity, availability and confidential security purposes. A Remote Administration Tool (RAT) was introduced for specific security attacks. An impact oriented process was performed for analyzing the assessment outcomes of the attacks. Tests and experiments of attacks were performed in simulation environment which was based on Gazbo Turtlebot simulator and physically on the robot. A software tool was used for simulating, debugging and experimenting on ROS platform. Integrity attacks performed for modifying commands and manipulated the robot behavior. Availability attacks were affected for Denial-of-Service (DoS) and the robot was not listened to Turtlebot commands. Integrity and availability attacks resulted sensitive information on the robot.

The fifth generation of cellular networks (5G) will enable different use cases where security will be more critical than ever before (e.g. autonomous vehicles and critical IoT devices). Unfortunately, the new networks are being built on the certainty that security problems cannot be solved in the short term. Far from reinventing the wheel, one of our goals is to allow security software developers to implement and test their reactive solutions for the capillary network of 5G devices. Therefore, in this paper a solution for analysing proximity-based attacks in 5G environments is modelled and tested using OMNET++. The solution, named CRAT, is able to decouple the security analysis from the hardware of the device with the aim to extend the analysis of proximity-based attacks to different use-cases in 5G. We follow a high-level approach, in which the devices can take the role of victim, offender and guardian following the principles of the routine activity theory.

Remote Access Trojans (RATs) give remote attackers interactive control over a compromised machine. Unlike large-scale malware such as botnets, a RAT is controlled individually by a human operator interacting with the compromised machine remotely. The versatility of RATs makes them attractive to actors of all levels of sophistication: they've been used for espionage, information theft, voyeurism and extortion. Despite their increasing use, there are still major gaps in our understanding of RATs and their operators, including motives, intentions, procedures, and weak points where defenses might be most effective. In this work we study the use of DarkComet, a popular commercial RAT. We collected 19,109 samples of DarkComet malware found in the wild, and in the course of two, several-week-long experiments, ran as many samples as possible in our honeypot environment. By monitoring a sample's behavior in our system, we are able to reconstruct the sequence of operator actions, giving us a unique view into operator behavior. We report on the results of 2,747 interactive sessions captured in the course of the experiment. During these sessions operators frequently attempted to interact with victims via remote desktop, to capture video, audio, and keystrokes, and to exfiltrate files and credentials. To our knowledge, we are the first large-scale systematic study of RAT use.