Biblio
This paper presents a computational model for managing an Embodied Conversational Agent's first impressions of warmth and competence towards the user. These impressions are important to manage because they can impact users' perception of the agent and their willingness to continue the interaction with the agent. The model aims at detecting user's impression of the agent and producing appropriate agent's verbal and nonverbal behaviours in order to maintain a positive impression of warmth and competence. User's impressions are recognized using a machine learning approach with facial expressions (action units) which are important indicators of users' affective states and intentions. The agent adapts in real-time its verbal and nonverbal behaviour, with a reinforcement learning algorithm that takes user's impressions as reward to select the most appropriate combination of verbal and non-verbal behaviour to perform. A user study to test the model in a contextualized interaction with users is also presented. Our hypotheses are that users' ratings differs when the agents adapts its behaviour according to our reinforcement learning algorithm, compared to when the agent does not adapt its behaviour to user's reactions (i.e., when it randomly selects its behaviours). The study shows a general tendency for the agent to perform better when using our model than in the random condition. Significant results shows that user's ratings about agent's warmth are influenced by their a-priori about virtual characters, as well as that users' judged the agent as more competent when it adapted its behaviour compared to random condition.
WireGuard is a free and open source Virtual Private Network (VPN) that aims to replace IPsec and OpenVPN. It is based on a new cryptographic protocol derived from the Noise Protocol Framework. This paper presents the first mechanised cryptographic proof of the protocol underlying WireGuard, using the CryptoVerif proof assistant. We analyse the entire WireGuard protocol as it is, including transport data messages, in an ACCE-style model. We contribute proofs for correctness, message secrecy, forward secrecy, mutual authentication, session uniqueness, and resistance against key compromise impersonation, identity mis-binding, and replay attacks. We also discuss the strength of the identity hiding provided by WireGuard. Our work also provides novel theoretical contributions that are reusable beyond WireGuard. First, we extend CryptoVerif to account for the absence of public key validation in popular Diffie-Hellman groups like Curve25519, which is used in many modern protocols including WireGuard. To our knowledge, this is the first mechanised cryptographic proof for any protocol employing such a precise model. Second, we prove several indifferentiability lemmas that are useful to simplify the proofs for sequences of key derivations.
Artificial neural networks are complex biologically inspired algorithms made up of highly distributed, adaptive and self-organizing structures that make them suitable for optimization problems. They are made up of a group of interconnected nodes, similar to the great networks of neurons in the human brain. So far, artificial neural networks have not been applied to user modeling in multi-criteria recommender systems. This paper presents neural networks-based user modeling technique that exploits some of the characteristics of biological neurons for improving the accuracy of multi-criteria recommendations. The study was based upon the aggregation function approach that computes the overall rating as a function of the criteria ratings. The proposed technique was evaluated using different evaluation metrics, and the empirical results of the experiments were compared with that of the single rating-based collaborative filtering and two other similarity-based modeling approaches. The two similarity-based techniques used are: the worst-case and the average similarity techniques. The results of the comparative analysis have shown that the proposed technique is more efficient than the two similarity-based techniques and the single rating collaborative filtering technique.
We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic attacker model. Our contributions are: 1) to design (and prove sound) axioms reflecting the properties of hash functions (Collision-Resistance, PRF). 2) to formalize computational unlinkability in the model. 3) to illustrate the method, providing the first formal proofs of unlinkability of RFID protocols, in the omputational model.
Insider threats can cause immense damage to organizations of different types, including government, corporate, and non-profit organizations. Being an insider, however, does not necessarily equate to being a threat. Effectively identifying valid threats, and assessing the type of threat an insider presents, remain difficult challenges. In this work, we propose a novel breakdown of eight insider threat types, identified by using three insider traits: predictability, susceptibility, and awareness. In addition to presenting this framework for insider threat types, we implement a computational model to demonstrate the viability of our framework with synthetic scenarios devised after reviewing real world insider threat case studies. The results yield useful insights into how further investigation might proceed to reveal how best to gauge predictability, susceptibility, and awareness, and precisely how they relate to the eight insider types.