Biblio

From signal processing to emerging deep neural networks, a range of applications exhibit intrinsic error resilience. For such applications, approximate computing opens up new possibilities for energy-efficient computing by producing slightly inaccurate results using greatly simplified hardware. Adopting this approach, a variety of basic arithmetic units, such as adders and multipliers, have been effectively redesigned to generate approximate results for many error-resilient applications.In this work, we propose SECO, an approximate exponential function unit (EFU). Exponentiation is a key operation in many signal processing applications and more importantly in spiking neuron models, but its energy-efficient implementation has been inadequately explored. We also introduce a cross-layer design method for SECO to optimize the energy-accuracy trade-off. At the algorithm level, SECO offers runtime scaling between energy efficiency and accuracy based on approximate Taylor expansion, where the error is minimized by optimizing parameters using discrete gradient descent at design time. At the circuit level, our error analysis method efficiently explores the design space to select the energy-accuracy-optimal approximate multiplier at design time. In tandem, the cross-layer design and runtime optimization method are able to generate energy-efficient and accurate approximate EFU designs that are up to 99.7% accurate at a power consumption of 3.73 pJ per exponential operation. SECO is also evaluated on the adaptive exponential integrate-and-fire neuron model, yielding only 0.002% timing error and 0.067% value error compared to the precise neuron model.

Software-defined networking is considered a promising new paradigm, enabling more reliable and formally verifiable communication networks. However, this paper shows that the separation of the control plane from the data plane, which lies at the heart of Software-Defined Networks (SDNs), introduces a new vulnerability which we call teleportation. An attacker (e.g., a malicious switch in the data plane or a host connected to the network) can use teleportation to transmit information via the control plane and bypass critical network functions in the data plane (e.g., a firewall), and to violate security policies as well as logical and even physical separations. This paper characterizes the design space for teleportation attacks theoretically, and then identifies four different teleportation techniques. We demonstrate and discuss how these techniques can be exploited for different attacks (e.g., exfiltrating confidential data at high rates), and also initiate the discussion of possible countermeasures. Generally, and given today's trend toward more intent-based networking, we believe that our findings are relevant beyond the use cases considered in this paper.