Biblio

A quantum high secure direct communication with authentication protocol is proposed by using single photons. The high security of the protocol is achieved on levels. The first level involves the verification of the quantum channel security by using fake photons. The authentication process is also ensured by the fake photons. The second level of security is given by the use of multiple polarization bases. The secret message is encoded in groups of photons; each single character of the message is associated with m (m≥7) photons. Thus, at least 27 (128) characters will be encoded. In order to defeat the quantum teleportation attack, the string of bits associated to the secret message is encrypted with a secret string of bits by using XOR operator. Encryption of the sender's identity string and the receiver's identity string by the XOR operator with a random string of fake photons defends quantum man-in-the-middle attack efficiently. Quantum memory is required to implement our protocol. Storage of quantum information is a key element in quantum information processing and provides a more flexible, effective and efficient communication. Our protocol is feasible with current technologies.

Software-defined networking is considered a promising new paradigm, enabling more reliable and formally verifiable communication networks. However, this paper shows that the separation of the control plane from the data plane, which lies at the heart of Software-Defined Networks (SDNs), introduces a new vulnerability which we call teleportation. An attacker (e.g., a malicious switch in the data plane or a host connected to the network) can use teleportation to transmit information via the control plane and bypass critical network functions in the data plane (e.g., a firewall), and to violate security policies as well as logical and even physical separations. This paper characterizes the design space for teleportation attacks theoretically, and then identifies four different teleportation techniques. We demonstrate and discuss how these techniques can be exploited for different attacks (e.g., exfiltrating confidential data at high rates), and also initiate the discussion of possible countermeasures. Generally, and given today's trend toward more intent-based networking, we believe that our findings are relevant beyond the use cases considered in this paper.