Biblio

Software defined networks represent a new centralized network abstraction that aims to ease configuration and facilitate applications and services deployment to manage the upper layers. However, SDN faces several challenges that slow down its implementation such as security which represents one of the top concerns of SDN experts. Indeed, SDN inherits all security matters from traditional networks and suffers from some additional vulnerability due to its centralized and unique architecture. Using traditional security devices and solutions to mitigate SDN threats can be very complicated and can negatively effect the networks performance. In this paper we propose a study that measures the impact of using some well-known security solution to mitigate intrusions on SDN's performances. We will also present an algorithm named KPG-MT adapted to SDN architecture that aims to mitigate threats such as a Man in the Middle, Deny of Services and malware-based attacks. An implementation of our algorithm based on multiple attacks' scenarios and mitigation processes will be made to prove the efficiency of the proposed framework.

Software defined networks (SDNs) represent new centralized network architecture that facilitates the deployment of services, applications and policies from the upper layers, relatively the management and control planes to the lower layers the data plane and the end user layer. SDNs give several advantages in terms of agility and flexibility, especially for mobile operators and for internet service providers. However, the implementation of these types of networks faces several technical challenges and security issues. In this paper we will focus on SDN's security issues and we will propose the implementation of a centralized security layer named AM-SecP. The proposed layer is linked vertically to all SDN layers which ease packets inspections and detecting intrusions. The purpose of this architecture is to stop and to detect malware infections, we do this by denying services and tunneling attacks without encumbering the networks by expensive operations and high calculation cost. The implementation of the proposed framework will be also made to demonstrate his feasibility and robustness.

The need to keep an attacker oblivious of an attack mitigation effort is a very important component of a defense against denial of services (DoS) and distributed denial of services (DDoS) attacks because it helps to dissuade attackers from changing their attack patterns. Conceptually, DDoS mitigation can be achieved by two components. The first is a decoy server that provides a service function or receives attack traffic as a substitute for a legitimate server. The second is a decoy network that restricts attack traffic to the peripheries of a network, or which reroutes attack traffic to decoy servers. In this paper, we propose the use of a two-stage map table extension Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) to realize a decoy network. We also describe and demonstrate how LISP can be used to implement an oblivious DDoS mitigation mechanism by adding a simple extension on the LISP MapServer. Together with decoy servers, this method can terminate DDoS traffic on the ingress end of an LISP-enabled network. We verified the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism through simulated DDoS attacks on a simple network topology. Our evaluation results indicate that the mechanism could be activated within a few seconds, and that the attack traffic can be terminated without incurring overhead on the MapServer.