Biblio

With the emergence of new digital trends like Internet of Things (IoT), more industry actors and technical committees pursue research in utilising such technologies as they promise a better and optimised management, improved energy efficiency and a better quality living through a wide array of value-added services. However, as sensing, actuation, communication and control become increasingly more sophisticated, such promising data-driven systems generate, process, and exchange larger amounts of security-critical and privacy-sensitive data, which makes them attractive targets of attacks. In turn this affirms the importance of trustworthiness in IoT and emphasises the need of a solid technical and regulatory foundation. The goal of this paper is to first introduce the concept of trustworthiness in IoT, its main pillars namely, security, privacy and data protection, and then analyse the state-of-the-art in research and standardisation for each of these subareas. Throughout the paper, we develop and refer to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as a promising value-added service example of mobile IoT devices. The paper then presents a thorough gap analysis and concludes with recommendations for future work.

The continuous discovery of exploitable vulnerabilitiesin popular applications (e.g., web browsers and documentviewers), along with their heightening protections against control flow hijacking, has opened the door to an oftenneglected attack strategy-namely, data-only attacks. In thispaper, we demonstrate the practicality of the threat posedby data-only attacks that harness the power of memorydisclosure vulnerabilities. To do so, we introduce memorycartography, a technique that simplifies the construction ofdata-only attacks in a reliable manner. Specifically, we showhow an adversary can use a provided memory mapping primitive to navigate through process memory at runtime, andsafely reach security-critical data that can then be modifiedat will. We demonstrate this capability by using our cross-platform memory cartography framework implementation toconstruct data-only exploits against Internet Explorer and Chrome. The outcome of these exploits ranges from simple HTTP cookie leakage, to the alteration of the same originpolicy for targeted domains, which enables the cross-originexecution of arbitrary script code. The ease with which we can undermine the security ofmodern browsers stems from the fact that although isolationpolicies (such as the same origin policy) are enforced atthe script level, these policies are not well reflected in theunderlying sandbox process models used for compartmentalization. This gap exists because the complex demands oftoday's web functionality make the goal of enforcing thesame origin policy through process isolation a difficult oneto realize in practice, especially when backward compatibility is a priority (e.g., for support of cross-origin IFRAMEs). While fixing the underlying problems likely requires a majorrefactoring of the security architecture of modern browsers(in the long term), we explore several defenses, includingglobal variable randomization, that can limit the power ofthe attacks presented herein.