Biblio
In this paper, we present the enhancement of a lightweight key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme designed for the Internet of Things (IoT). The KP-ABE scheme was claimed to achieve ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack in the selective-set model but we show that the KP-ABE scheme is insecure even in the weaker security notion, namely, one-way encryption under the same attack and model. In particular, we show that an attacker can decrypt a ciphertext which does not satisfy the policy imposed on his decryption key. Subsequently, we propose an efficient fix to the KP-ABE scheme as well as extending it to be a hierarchical KP-ABE (H-KP-ABE) scheme that can support role delegation in IoT applications. An example of applying our H-KP-ABE on an IoT-connected healthcare system is given to highlight the benefit of the delegation feature. Lastly, using the NIST curves secp192k1 and secp256k1, we benchmark the fixed (hierarchical) KP-ABE scheme on an Android phone and the result shows that the scheme is still the fastest in the literature.
The chaotic system and cryptography have some common features. Due to the close relationship between chaotic system and cryptosystem, researchers try to combine the chaotic system with cryptosystem. In this study, security analysis of an encryption algorithm which aims to encrypt the data with ECG signals and chaotic functions was performed using the Logistic map in text encryption and Henon map in image encryption. In the proposed algorithm, text and image data can be encrypted at the same time. In addition, ECG signals are used to determine the initial conditions and control parameters of the chaotic functions used in the algorithm to personalize of the encryption algorithm. In this cryptanalysis study, the inadequacy of the mentioned process and the weaknesses of the proposed method have been determined. Encryption algorithm has not sufficient capacity to provide necessary security level of key space and secret key can be obtained with only one plaintext/ciphertext pair with chosen-plaintext attack.