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Filters: Keyword is fault and intrusion tolerance  [Clear All Filters]
2020-07-27
Vöelp, Marcus, Esteves-Verissimo, Paulo.  2018.  Intrusion-Tolerant Autonomous Driving. 2018 IEEE 21st International Symposium on Real-Time Distributed Computing (ISORC). :130–133.
Fully autonomous driving is one if not the killer application for the upcoming decade of real-time systems. However, in the presence of increasingly sophisticated attacks by highly skilled and well equipped adversarial teams, autonomous driving must not only guarantee timeliness and hence safety. It must also consider the dependability of the software concerning these properties while the system is facing attacks. For distributed systems, fault-and-intrusion tolerance toolboxes already offer a few solutions to tolerate partial compromise of the system behind a majority of healthy components operating in consensus. In this paper, we present a concept of an intrusion-tolerant architecture for autonomous driving. In such a scenario, predictability and recovery challenges arise from the inclusion of increasingly more complex software on increasingly less predictable hardware. We highlight how an intrusion tolerant design can help solve these issues by allowing timeliness to emerge from a majority of complex components being fast enough, often enough while preserving safety under attack through pre-computed fail safes.
2017-12-28
Esteves-Verissimo, P., Völp, M., Decouchant, J., Rahli, V., Rocha, F..  2017.  Meeting the Challenges of Critical and Extreme Dependability and Security. 2017 IEEE 22nd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC). :92–97.

The world is becoming an immense critical information infrastructure, with the fast and increasing entanglement of utilities, telecommunications, Internet, cloud, and the emerging IoT tissue. This may create enormous opportunities, but also brings about similarly extreme security and dependability risks. We predict an increase in very sophisticated targeted attacks, or advanced persistent threats (APT), and claim that this calls for expanding the frontier of security and dependability methods and techniques used in our current CII. Extreme threats require extreme defenses: we propose resilience as a unifying paradigm to endow systems with the capability of dynamically and automatically handling extreme adversary power, and sustaining perpetual and unattended operation. In this position paper, we present this vision and describe our methodology, as well as the assurance arguments we make for the ultra-resilient components and protocols they enable, illustrated with case studies in progress.