Biblio

Our goal is to refocus the question about cybersecurity research from 'is this process scientific' to 'why is this scientific process producing unsatisfactory results'. We focus on five common complaints that claim cybersecurity is not or cannot be scientific. Many of these complaints presume views associated with the philosophical school known as Logical Empiricism that more recent scholarship has largely modified or rejected. Modern philosophy of science, supported by mathematical modeling methods, provides constructive resources to mitigate all purported challenges to a science of security. Therefore, we argue the community currently practices a science of cybersecurity. A philosophy of science perspective suggests the following form of practice: structured observation to seek intelligible explanations of phenomena, evaluating explanations in many ways, with specialized fields (including engineering and forensics) constraining explanations within their own expertise, inter-translating where necessary. A natural question to pursue in future work is how collecting, evaluating, and analyzing evidence for such explanations is different in security than other sciences.

Monitoring systems are essential to understand and control the behaviour of systems and networks. Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are particularly delicate under that perspective since they involve real-time constraints and physical phenomena that are not usually considered in common IT solutions. Therefore, there is a need for publicly available monitoring tools able to contemplate these aspects. In this poster/demo, we present our initiative, called CPS-MT, towards a versatile, real-time CPS monitoring tool, with a particular focus on security research. We first present its architecture and main components, followed by a MiniCPS-based case study. We also describe a performance analysis and preliminary results. During the demo, we will discuss CPS-MT's capabilities and limitations for security applications.

The past ten years has seen increasing calls to make security research more “scientific”. On the surface, most agree that this is desirable, given universal recognition of “science” as a positive force. However, we find that there is little clarity on what “scientific” means in the context of computer security research, or consensus on what a “Science of Security” should look like. We selectively review work in the history and philosophy of science and more recent work under the label “Science of Security”. We explore what has been done under the theme of relating science and security, put this in context with historical science, and offer observations and insights we hope may motivate further exploration and guidance. Among our findings are that practices on which the rest of science has reached consensus appear little used or recognized in security, and a pattern of methodological errors continues unaddressed.