Biblio

Security of sensible data for ultraconstrained IoT smart devices is one of the most challenging task in modern design. The needs of CPA-resistant cryptographic devices has to deal with the demanding requirements of small area and small impact on the overall power consumption. In this work, a novel current-mode feedback suppressor as on-chip analog-level CPA countermeasure is proposed. It aims to suppress differences in power consumption due to data-dependency of CMOS cryptographic devices, in order to counteract CPA attacks. The novel countermeasure is able to improve MTD of unprotected CMOS implementation of at least three orders of magnitude, providing a ×1.1 area and ×1.7 power overhead.

This research investigates changes in the electromagnetic (EM) signatures of a cryptographic binary executable based on compile-time parameters to the GNU and clang compilers. The source code was compiled and executed on a Raspberry Pi 2, which utilizes the ARMv7 CPU. Various optimization flags are enabled at compile-time and the output of the binary executable's EM signatures are captured at run-time. It is demonstrated that GNU and clang compilers produced different EM signature on program execution. The results indicated while utilizing the O3 optimization flag, the EM signature of the program changes. Additionally, the g++ compiler demonstrated fewer instructions were required to run the executable; this related to fewer EM emissions leaked. The EM data from the various compilers under different optimization levels was used as input data for a correlation power analysis attack. The results indicated that partial AES-128 encryption keys was possible. In addition, the fewest subkeys recovered was when the clang compiler was used with level O2 optimization. Finally, the research was able to recover 15 of 16 AES-128 cryptographic algorithm's subkeys, from the the Pi.