Biblio

It seems impossible to certify that a remote hosting service does not leak its users' data - or does quantum mechanics make it possible? We investigate if a server hosting data can information-theoretically prove its definite deletion using a "BB84-like" protocol. To do so, we first rigorously introduce an alternative to privacy by encryption: privacy delegation. We then apply this novel concept to provable deletion and remote data storage. For both tasks, we present a protocol, sketch its partial security, and display its vulnerability to eavesdropping attacks targeting only a few bits.

Cloud computing is a new computing paradigm which encourages remote data storage. This facility shoots up the necessity of secure data auditing mechanism over outsourced data. Several mechanisms are proposed in the literature for supporting dynamic data. However, most of the existing schemes lack the security feature, which can withstand collusion attacks between the cloud server and the abrogated users. This paper presents a technique to overthrow the collusion attacks and the data auditing mechanism is achieved by means of vector commitment and backward unlinkable verifier local revocation group signature. The proposed work supports multiple users to deal with the remote cloud data. The performance of the proposed work is analysed and compared with the existing techniques and the experimental results are observed to be satisfactory in terms of computational and time complexity.